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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGN
OF FUTURE STATE PROGRAMS
Thomas Alcorn *
Global climate change has emerged as one of the greatest challenges of our
time. While action has stalled on the national stage, states have started to take
action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Confronted with the risk of severe impacts that could cost it tens of billions of dollars annually by the end of the
century, California has taken the lead and developed the first comprehensive
cap-and-trade program in the nation and seeks to achieve significant reductions
in the greenhouse gas emissions associated with its economy. The success of California’s program will determine whether other states and the federal government
follow California’s lead. If California’s cap-and-trade program is defeated by legal challenges or is excessively economically burdensome, it might spell the end of
cap-and-trade programs in the United States. The most formidable legal challenge will be brought under the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits
states from discriminating against, regulating, or unduly burdening interstate
commerce. This Article analyzes California’s cap-and-trade program under the
dormant Commerce Clause and suggests refinements that could be adopted by
California or other states implementing cap-and-trade programs to improve the
odds of prevailing against such a challenge. While California will almost certainly be forced to make regulatory concessions, especially in its regulation of the
electricity sector, I conclude that state cap-and-trade programs can be structured
in a way that, while not ideal, can survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
while providing meaningful regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and protection
from emissions leakage.
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INTRODUCTION
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.
–Justice Louis Brandeis 1
Once again, California has taken the lead in pioneering environmental
regulations to deal with one of the greatest environmental threats of our
time: climate change. 2 The stakes are high. Unabated, climate change will
have far-reaching effects, including widespread droughts, rising sea levels,
severe heat waves, and biodiversity loss. 3 It is vital that action be taken to
1.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., &
Thomas, J., dissenting) (“One o� federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes
innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.’” (quoting Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311)).
2.
There is a clear scientific consensus that climate change is happening. See, e.g.,
Letter from the Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. to United States Senators 1 (Oct. 21,
2009), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/ssi/climate-change-statementfrom.pdf (letter signed by the official representatives of eighteen scientific societies); Committee on America’s Climate Choices, America’s Climate Choices (2011), NAT’L ACADEMIES,
http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Americas-Climate-Choices/12781 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013);
William R. L. Anderegg, James W. Prall, Jacob Harold & Stephen H. Schneider, Expert
Credibility in Climate Change, 107 PNAS 12107, 12107–09 (2010), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/107/27/12107.full.pdf+html.
3.
There has already been substantial warming that is causing massive droughts,
forest fires, and other problems; see, e.g., Jef� Black, July Is Hottest Month on Record; Drought
Expands to 63 Percent of United States, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 8, 2012, 1:02 PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/08/13182298-july-is-hottest-month-on-recorddrought-expands-to-63-percent-of-united-states?lite (record-breaking heat waves and widespread drought in United States); Joshua Lott, Wildfire Season 2012, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/forest_and_brush_fires/index.html (last
updated June 26, 2012) (especially volatile wildfire season); Sue Ogrocki, Blame Blistering
Heat Waves on Global Warming, Study Says, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2012, 11:04 AM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/05/13129330-blame-blistering-heat-waves-on-
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reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and California has moved to the
forefront by developing the first economy-wide cap-and-trade program in
the United States. 4 California’s experiment is likely to determine the fate of
serious efforts to reduce GHG emissions in the United States. Successfully
implementing a cap-and-trade program would encourage other states to
join and possibly catalyze federal action, as California’s environmental
initiatives have in the past. 5 Failing to overcome legal challenges against, or
manage the potentially negative economic impacts of, the program could
spell the end for cap-and-trade programs in the United States.
Other efforts at implementing programs to reduce GHG emissions in
the United States, and indeed throughout the world, have met with mixed
results. 6 At the federal level, Congress appears unwilling to tackle climate
change in the near future. 7 After Congress failed to pass a climate change
bill, President Obama, acting through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), moved forward with new rules setting emission standards for
vehicles and the highest-emitting new power plants and industrial facilities. 8 These regulations are being vigorously opposed by many Republicans

global-warming-study-says?lite (record-breaking heat waves caused by climate change). See
also infra Part I.A.
4.
Jason Dearen, California ‘Cap-and-Trade Plan’ Poised to be Finalized, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 20, 2011, 8:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/california-capand-trade_n_1022314.html. A cap-and-trade program is a method of reducing GHG emissions. A cap is placed on the total quantity of GHG emissions, and the cap is reduced each
year to achieve the desired reduction in GHG emissions. The cap is enforced through the
allocation of allowances that allow regulated entities to emit GHGs. These allowances can be
traded by regulated entities so that the most cost-effective reductions are undertaken. See
infra text accompanying notes 64–71.
5.
Brie� for Professors o� Envtl. Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6–
18, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131,
12-15135), 2012 WL 2376704.
6.
See, e.g., Erin Conway-Smith, COP 17: Deal Reached at UN Climate Talks in Durban,
GLOBALPOST (Dec. 11, 2011, 5:53 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/
africa/south-africa/111211/cop-17-news-durban-platform-deal-reached-un-climate-changetalks (mixed results from international negotiations); Jim Efstathiou Jr., Obama Faces Tough
Fight Over EPA’s Carbon Emission Rules, Beinecke Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2010, 6:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-15/obama-faces-tough-fight-over-epa-s-carbonemission-rules-beinecke-says.html (federal cap-and-trade bill passed by House o� Representatives but not Senate).
7.
Ben Geman, Heat Wave, Fires Have Climate Change Activists Going On the Offensive,
THE HILL (July 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/236391-heatwave-fires-leave-some-climate-change-supporters-looking-to-go-on-offense (“Global warming legislation collapsed in Congress in 2010 and has no chance of advancement in the
foreseeable future.”).
8.
See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Court Backs E.P.A. Over Emissions Limits Intended to Reduce
Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/science/earth/epaemissions-rules-backed-by-court.html.
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and may be eliminated by legislation stripping the EPA of its authority to
regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. 9
With federal action on climate change limited and of uncertain longevity, states have taken the lead by developing subnational strategies to reduce
GHG emissions. The first regional cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions was implemented by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), a consortium of nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states. 10 The
program, which began in 2009, is limited to the electricity sector and seeks
to reduce GHG emissions to 10 percent below 2009 levels by 2018. 11 While
the RGGI program represents a promising start, its reductions of GHG
emissions are small and might not even be attained. 12
A second consortium formed to address climate change is the Western
Climate Initiative (WCI). 13 At its height, it had seven state and four Canadian province members 14 that planned to implement a comprehensive
regional cap-and-trade program to reduce GHG emissions to 15 percent
below 2005 levels by 2020. 15 Every state besides California withdrew from
the WCI, and only California and Quebec started cap-and-trade programs

9.
Id.
10.
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Feb.
22, 2013). The nine state members of the RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id.
11.
About the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited June 3, 2013); The
RGGI CO2 Cap, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/design/overview/cap
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
12.
The RGGI is at risk for significant leakage, which occurs when regulated entities
move from a regulating state to a nonregulating state to avoid having to reduce emissions.
RICHARD COWART, ADDRESSING LEAKAGE IN A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM: TREATING
IMPORTS AS SOURCES 1–4 (2006), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP
_Cowart_CapAndTradeLeakage_2006_11.pdf. The electricity sector is especially prone to
leakage because of the ease with which electricity can be transported.
13.
WCI Partners Release Their Comprehensive Strategy to Address Climate Change and
Spur a Clean-Energy Economy, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE (July 27, 2010), http://www.western
climateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/program-design/Program-DesignRelease-Statement/.
14.
The state partners included Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington, and the Canadian province partners include British Columbia,
Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.western
climateinitiative.org/history (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
15.
Frequently Asked Questions, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateini
tiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/faq (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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in 2013. 16 Legal challenges to California’s program have already been
launched 17 and more are sure to follow. 18
The most significant legal challenge to California’s cap-and-trade program will be brought under the dormant Commerce Clause, 19 which
prohibits states from discriminating against, extraterritorially regulating, or
unduly burdening interstate commerce. 20 Indeed, a federal district court
struck down California’s low carbon fuel standard, another part of the state’s
comprehensive plan to reduce GHG emissions, under the dormant Commerce Clause. 21 While this decision was recently reversed by the Ninth
Circuit by a two-to-one vote on appeal, it highlights the significant threat
16.
See Marc D. Luesebrink, Carb Cap and Trade Linkage Effort with Quebec Back on
Track: Reopened Comment Period Ends January 23rd, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8a7821d5-a122-4c66-a6ed-8aa5cb0dd1fc.
17.
Cassandra Sweet, California Cap-and-Trade Faces Potential Hurdle, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 3, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870330090457617
8431416877032.html. Environmental justice groups challenged the cap-and-trade regulations
under the California Environmental Quality Act, alleging that an inadequate environmental
review was undertaken and that the cap-and-trade program was not authorized by statute. Id.
The trial court held that the program was authorized but ordered regulators to more thoroughly assess the alternatives (for example, a carbon tax) and explain why they were rejected.
Ass’n o� Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 70–71 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the cap-and-trade program
was authorized by statute. Id. at 79–81. Environmental justice groups have also challenged
the offset protocols on the basis that they undermine the climate change statute and have
filed a complaint with the EPA alleging violations of constitutional rights because the capand-trade program will increase pollution in poor neighborhoods. Jane K. Murphy, California’s Greenhouse Gas “Cap and Trade” Program Survives Legal Challenge, MONDAQ (Aug. 20,
2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/192176/Climate+Change/US+Regulatory+De
velopments; Peter Fimrite, EPA Complaint Says Cap and Trade Racially Biased, S.F. CHRON.
(June 12, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/EPA-complaint-says-capand-trade-racially-biased-3626368.php. This challenge was defeated in the trial court. Karen
Gullo & Lynn Doan, California Defeats Lawsuit Against Cap-and-Trade Program, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 28, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/california-defeatslawsuit-against-cap-and-trade-program-1-.html. Finally, the California Chamber of Commerce has challenged the program on the basis that the sale of permits constitutes an
unauthorized and unconstitutional tax under California law. Jason Dearen, California Group
Sues To Invalidate Cap-and-Trade, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 13, 2012), http://
www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-11-13/calif-dot-group-sues-to-invalidate-cap-and-trade.
18.
In addition to private parties, the attorney generals of at least four states, Alabama, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Texas, are considering suing to stop California’s capand-trade program on the basis that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Mark
Schapiro, Four States Prepare Legal Assault on California’s Climate Law, CAL. WATCH (Sept. 8,
2010), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/four-states-prepare-legal-assault-californias-clim
ate-law-4564.
19.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20.
See infra Part II.
21.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084–94
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2013).
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that the dormant Commerce Clause poses to state regulation. 22 Although
the dormant Commerce Clause mandate is normally easy enough to comply
with, the complexities of the modern economy, especially the electricity
markets, make it exceptionally difficult to create an effective cap-and-trade
program that is free of dormant Commerce Clause problems.
This Article assesses the constitutionality of California’s cap-and-trade
program under the dormant Commerce Clause, both analyzing the most
important issues facing California and other states considering cap-andtrade programs and suggesting refinements that improve the odds of surviving scrutiny. As California is currently only regulating imports in the
electricity sector, much of this Article focuses on the regulation of the electricity sector. Notably, this appears to be the first time that a state has
attempted to regulate imported goods to account for associated air pollution. Part I describes California’s interest in abating climate change, the
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 23 and the design of
California’s cap-and-trade program. Part II examines the relevant dormant
Commerce Clause case law, attempting to bring coherence to an area of the
law that Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has described as “ ‘tangled
underbrush’ ” that “has proved virtually unworkable in application.” 24
Part III evaluates California’s cap-and-trade program under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, focusing on the features that are most
vulnerable to a challenge. In addition to analyzing California’s adopted
approach, I suggest refinements that improve the odds that California’s capand-trade program will withstand a challenge and that could be adopted by
other states designing cap-and-trade programs. While some regulatory
concessions are likely to be necessary, I conclude that states can effectively
regulate GHG emissions using cap-and-trade programs despite the limitations imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause.

I. THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
A. California’s Special Interest in Abating Climate Change
Climate change has already come to California, and it is expected to
have severe impacts on the state over the next century. 25 California has seen
climate change cause its snowfall to change to rain, its wildfire seasons to
22.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1077-78.
23.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2012).
24.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town o� Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610–12 & n.3
(1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nw. States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959)).
25.
Mary D. Nichols, California’s Climate Change Program: Lessons for the Nation, 27
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 186–87 (2009).
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lengthen and intensify, its sea levels to rise seven inches in the last century,
and its air quality to deteriorate. 26 These effects are expected to worsen
even if GHG emissions are reduced to 80 percent below 1990 levels by
2050, and they are expected to significantly worsen if GHG emissions
continue unabated under business as usual. 27 A look at the expected impacts
of climate change under the business-as-usual scenario will shed some light
on the magnitude of California’s interest in reducing GHG emissions.
First, climate change is expected to increase the average temperature in
California by 0.5–2°C within the first thirty years of the twenty-first century and by 1.5–5.8°C by the last thirty years of the twenty-first century. 28
Second, it is expected to strain California’s water supply, with most models
predicting that precipitation will decrease by approximately 5% in the
Sacramento area and 15% or more in Southern California. 29 Additionally,
California’s snowpack is expected to melt off earlier and decrease in size. 30
When these effects are combined with the expected increase in evaporative
water loss from the higher temperatures, 31 the potential shortfall of water
from expected demand (accounting for population and urban growth) in
2050 is staggering: 5.2 million acre-feet per year, even after reducing environmental flow requirements for a number of major rivers. 32 Considering
that California already faces severe water shortages, this does not portend
well for California’s profitable farming industry, which consumes 80% of
the water used in California, especially in conjunction with projected decreases in yields as a result of climate change. 33 Gross annual agricultural
revenues could decline by as much as $3 billion by 2050. 34
Third, the increased temperatures and decreased precipitation will intensify the forest fires that already ravage California during the summer. 35
26.
27.

Id.
See Bettina Boxall, Report Outlines Possible Effects of Warming on California, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/02/local/me-climate2; CLIMATE
ACTION TEAM, CLIMATE ACTION TEAM BIENNIAL REPORT 1.3–.28 (2010), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CAT-1000-2010-004/CAT-1000-2010-004.PDF
(providing a comprehensive assessment of climate change risks to California based on
scientific studies); Nichols, supra note 25, at 186–87.
28.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.5–.6.
29.
Id. at 1.7.
30.
Id. at 1.8.
31.
Id. at 1.7.
32.
Id. at 1.18.
33.
CTR. FOR IRRIGATION TECH., CAL. STATE UNIV., FRESNO, AGRICULTURE
WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: A 2011 UPDATE 3 (2011), available at www.californiawater.org/
cwi/docs/CIT_AWU_REPORT_v2.pdf.
34.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 2.4–.9. This estimate accounts for
expected crop substitutions. Id.
35.
Id. at 1.12–.14; Governor Jerry Brown Declares State of Emergency in Counties Affected
by Wildfire, NBCNEWS.COM (August 21, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/
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The mean number o� large fires is projected to increase by 58–128 percent
and the mean burned area is projected to increase by 57–169 percent by
2050. 36 These increases are expected to result in additional fire costs of
$0.2–2.3 billion annually by 2050 and $0.7–14 billion annually by 2085. 37
Fourth, sea levels are expected to rise eleven to eighteen inches by 2050
and twenty-three to fifty-five inches by 2100. 38 This rise is the projected
result of reduced global snowpack (from melting) and thermal expansion of
the sea induced by increased average global temperatures. 39 Studies estimate that $50 billion worth of property and 260,000 people are currently at
risk for flooding. 40 If sea levels rise by fifty-five inches, a total of $100
billion worth of property and 475,000 people currently along the coast
would be at risk for inundation by the sea. 41 Building levees and sea walls to
protect these areas is projected to cost at least $14 billion, with additional
annual maintenance costs of $1.4 billion. 42 Additionally, higher sea levels
mean increased erosion that could result in a loss o� forty-one square miles
of California coast by 2100. 43
Fifth, climate change is expected to worsen air quality and public
health in California. 44 Increased temperatures lead to increased biogenic
emissions, strengthened temperature inversion events, and summertime
stagnation episodes. 45 Together, these effects increase ozone formation and
_news/2012/08/21/13394413-wildfires-wreak-havoc-across-western-us-smoke-visible-fromspace?lite.
36.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.12–.14.
37.
Id. at 2.12.
38.
Id. at 1.9–.12.
39.
SUSANNE C. MOSER & GUIDO FRANCO, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, THE FUTURE IS
NOW: AN UPDATE ON CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE, IMPACTS, AND RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR
CALIFORNIA 5 (2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-5002008-077/CEC-500-2008-077.PDF (also noting that the rate of sea level rise has increased
from 0.07 inches per year to 0.12 inches per year in the last decade of the twentieth century).
40.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.21–.23.
41.
Id. at 1.21–.23, 2.18–.19.
42.
Id. at 2.18–.19.
43.
Id. at 2.19.
44.
Id. at 1.26. California already experiences some of the worst air quality in the
country, despite spending $10 billion annually to control air pollution. Id.
45.
Id. at 1.26–.28. Biogenic emissions are “emissions of volatile organic compounds
from vegetation and emissions of nitrogen oxides from soil.” Glossary, ENV’T CAN.,
http://www.ec.gc.ca/inrp-npri/default.asp?lang=en&n=9264E929-1#t (last updated May 14,
2012). Temperature inversion events occur when warm air traps cold air and pollutants
underneath it, typically near ground level. Stuart Tomlinson, Strong Temperature Inversion
Will Keep It Cold and Smoggy in the Valleys, Unseasonably Warm in the Mountains, THE
OREGONIAN (Jan. 15, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/weather/index.ssf/
2013/01/strong_temperature_inversion_w.html. A stagnation event occurs when there is little
change in the air located in a particular area, which results in the build-up of pollution.
Weather Research and Forecasting Model Simulates Climate Change in California, DEP’T OF
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particulate matter concentrations, leading to low air quality that threatens
to wipe out all expected gains from pollution control through 2050. 46 The
cost of offsetting these effects to achieve targeted air quality is projected at
$8 billion annually. 47 The combination of worsening air quality and higher
temperatures, including many extreme temperature events, is expected to
cause increased mortality and to have adverse effects on public health generally. 48
Sixth, the increased temperatures and water transportation needs will
require increased energy use in California. 49 Residential energy demand is
expected to grow above that anticipated from population growth by 7% in
the next few decades and by up to 50% by the end of the century. 50 In addition, California’s production of inexpensive hydropower, which accounts for
15% of in-state energy generation, is expected to decline significantly by the
end of the century. 51 The residential-sector costs of increased energy use are
projected at $1.6 billion annually by 2050 and $15 billion annually by 2100,
and the loss of value from reduced hydropower production is estimated to
cost $0.5 billion annually by 2085. 52
Finally, climate change is already affecting California’s ecosystems and
these effects are expected to increase significantly. 53 While the magnitude
of environmental damage and the changes in environmental services are
difficult to predict or monetize, California’s interest in preserving its
environment and maintaining environmental services deserves significant
weight when considering California’s interest in abating climate change. 54

B. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 and California’s
Bold Leadership in Addressing Climate Change
The California legislature passed the California Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), to address the
LAND, AIR AND WATER RES., UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS (2011), available at
http://lawr.ucdavis.edu/newsletter/w11-climatechange.htm.
46.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.26–.28.
47.
Id. at 2.25.
48.
Id. at 1.28–.30.
49.
Id. at 1.23–.24.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 1.24–.25.
52.
Id. at 2.23–.24.
53.
MOSER & FRANCO, supra note 39, at 4. Changes in climate can wreak havoc on
ecosystems. For example, the changes in seasonal timing alter the lifecycles and competitiveness of many plants and animals. Migratory birds are particularly vulnerable to these
changes because their journey is timed to coincide with plentiful food. Changing seasonable
timing can jeopardize the survival of these birds because they may no longer find the resources that they need when they need them. Id.
54.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 2.26.
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potentially enormous costs of climate change by mandating that the state
reduce its GHG emissions. 55 The legislature clearly articulated its findings
and intent:
Global warming poses a serious threat to the economic well-being,
public health, natural resources, and the environment of California.
The potential adverse impacts of global warming include the exacerbation of air quality problems, a reduction in the quality and
supply of water to the state from the Sierra snowpack, a rise in sea
levels resulting in the displacement of thousands of coastal businesses and residences, damage to marine ecosystems and the
natural environment, and an increase in the incidences of infectious
diseases, asthma, and other human health-related problems.
....
. . . California has long been a national and international leader on
energy conservation and environmental stewardship efforts . . .
[and this law] will continue this tradition of environmental leadership by placing California at the forefront of national and
international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
. . . National and international actions are necessary to fully address the issue of global warming. However, action taken by
California to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have farreaching effects by encouraging other states, the federal government, and other countries to act.
. . . By exercising a global leadership role, California will also position its economy, technology centers, financial institutions, and
businesses to benefit from national and international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases . . . [while taking] a global
economic and technological leadership role in reducing emissions
of greenhouse gases. 56
AB 32 charged the California Air Resources Board (CARB) with developing a program to “achieve the maximum technologically feasible and
cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” possible. 57 AB 32
requires that, at an ambitious minimum, California reduce its GHG
55.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (West 2012).
56.
Id.
57.
Id. § 38562. CARB is to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride.
Id. § 38505(g).
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emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. 58 To the extent feasible, CARB was ordered to design the cap-and-trade program in an equitable manner that
minimizes costs and maximizes benefits to California. CARB was also
directed to encourage “early action to reduce [GHGs],” take into account
overall societal benefits that could be achieved, and “[m]inimize leakage.” 59
CARB was given the power to create a program to reduce GHG emissions, but it was required to ensure that the reductions of GHG emissions
“achieved are real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable.” 60
After assessing a variety of options for reducing carbon emissions, CARB
decided to implement a cap-and-trade program.

C. Cap-and-Trade Program Overview
Pursuant to AB 32’s mandate, CARB has developed the first comprehensive cap-and-trade program in the United States. CARB’s governing
board approved the final program, which regulates 85 percent of the sources
of GHG emissions in California, on October 20, 2011. 61 The program became operational at the start of 2012, but regulated entities did not have
compliance obligations until January 1, 2013. 62 This section describes capand-trade programs generally and then provides an overview of the California program.
Cap-and-trade programs are relatively simple to understand. First, a
cap is placed on GHG emissions to stop further growth in the covered
sectors. 63 Then, a trajectory is developed for how this cap will decrease over
time to reach the desired level of emissions on a target date. 64 Allowances
are created to enforce the cap, with each allowance conveying a right to
emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (MTCO2e). 65 These
allowances are distributed to the regulated entities either through direct
allocation by the government or through auctions. 66 Once the allowances
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. § 38550.
Id. § 38562(a)–(b).
Id. § 38562(c)–(d)(1).
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM,
RESOLUTION 11-32, at 10–11 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/
capandtrade10/res11-32.pdf [hereinafter RESOLUTION 11-32].
62.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE
CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF
REASONS II-1 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/
capisor.pdf [hereinafter INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS]; Gina-Marie Cheeseman, California and Quebec Will Link Cap-and-Trade Programs, TRIPLE PUNDIT (May 15, 2012),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/05/california-quebec-will-link-cap-trade-programs/.
63.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-1 to -2.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at II-3 to -4.
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are distributed, the regulated entities are free to trade them with each other. 67 Through this trading, GHG emissions are reduced in the most
efficient manner. 68 Regulated entities reduce their GHG emissions when
the cost of doing so is less than the cost of allowances, and they then sell
excess allowances to entities that cannot reduce emissions as cheaply. 69 As
the cap tightens and fewer allowances are distributed, the price of allowances and the cost of emissions reductions increase. 70
A cap-and-trade program would function very efficiently if the entire
world participated because there would be no way to escape the regulation,
such that real reductions in GHG emissions would have to occur for there
to be compliance with the cap. In the real world, only some jurisdictions are
regulating GHG emissions using cap-and-trade programs. As a result,
emitters in the regulating jurisdictions are able to escape the cap-and-trade
program by moving to nonregulating jurisdictions. Additionally, emitters in
the regulating jurisdictions may lose market share to emitters in the nonregulating jurisdictions. When either of these phenomena occurs, there are
phantom reductions in GHG emissions because, while there is a reduction
of emissions within the regulating jurisdictions, the total world emissions
have not decreased. This is called “leakage,” and it can significantly reduce
the effectiveness of cap-and-trade programs. 71
California has set ambitious targets for its reduction of GHGs, aiming
to reduce GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020. 72 Meeting this goal will require
reducing GHG emissions by 11 percent below current levels and 29 percent
below projected levels in 2020 under a business-as-usual scenario. 73 To
support the cap-and-trade program, CARB established GHG reporting
requirements for facilities that emit 10,000 MTCO2e or more. 74 Since the
EPA has promulgated its own mandatory GHG reporting requirements,
California has adopted the EPA rules but adjusted them to impose the
more stringent requirements necessary to support a cap-and-trade program. 75
The program became operational in 2012, but it delayed imposing
compliance obligations until January 1, 2013 to give regulators more time to
implement, and regulated parties more time to understand and adjust to,
67.
Id. at II-1 to -2.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
See id. at ES-2, II-1 to -2.
71.
Id. at II-26.
72.
RESOLUTION 11-32, supra note 61, at 6.
73.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX M., CPUC/CEC JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS
M-9 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appm.pdf [hereinafter CPUC/CEC JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS].
74.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-7 to -9.
75.
Id. at II-8.
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the program. A two-year compliance period began on January 1, 2013, and
it will be followed by two three-year compliance periods, over which time
the amount of emissions permitted (the “emissions cap”) decreases. 76 The
initial cap in 2013 requires emissions to be reduced below 2012 levels, and
all electricity generators and large industrial facilities that emit 25,000
MTCO2e or more are required to obtain allowances to emit GHGs. 77 Beginning in 2015, the program expands to include fuel distributors, covering
emissions from the combustion of gas, diesel, natural gas, and propane from
entities with emissions below 25,000 MTCO2e, and the combustion o� fuels
used in the transportation sector. 78
The program utilizes two different methods of allocating allowances to
covered entities: an auction to the electricity sector, which is described in
Part I.D, infra, and benchmarked, updating, output-based allocation to
other industries. 79 To create the output-based allocations, CARB assessed
each industrial sector to determine its GHG intensity and its exposure to
trade competition from industry in unregulated states, through which the
industrial sector’s ability to pass compliance costs on to consumers is measured. 80 Based on this analysis, an industry-specific assistance factor is
assigned and plugged into an equation to determine how many free allowances will be allocated to each industrial facility. 81 The more trade exposed
and GHG-intensive an industry, the more allowances it will be allocated for
free. 82 However, to keep facilities from shutting down or transferring production out of the state and then selling their allocated allowances, the
formula ties the allocation of allowances to the production output or energy
use of each facility. 83
Two attributes of this method provide incentives for facilities to reduce
their emissions. First, many facilities are not provided with all of the allowances that they will need because they have not been provided a 100 percent
assistance factor. 84 Second, the allowances are allocated based on emissions
benchmarks, which are basically the emissions per product produced or unit

76.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95840 (2012).
77.
Id. § 95851.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. §§ 95890–95891; INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-30.
80.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX K., LEAKAGE ANALYSIS K-8 to -30
(2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appk.pdf [hereinafter LEAKAGE ANALYSIS]; INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-26 to -27.
81.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX J, ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION J-21 to -23
(2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf [hereinafter ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION].
82.
Id. at J-21 to -22.
83.
Id. at J-31 to -32.
84.
Id. at J-21 to -23.
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of thermal energy used that the industry is expected to attain. 85 The
benchmark calculation is complicated, but benchmarks are essentially set at
the emissions intensity o� highly efficient, low-emitting facilities in each
industrial sector. 86 This method of allocation creates incentives for facilities
to reduce emissions because there is both the risk o� having to purchase
more allowances and the potential benefit of selling excess allowances. 87 As
a result, the most efficient technologies will be used in each industry as
regulators require less GHG emissions per product produced or unit of
thermal energy used. 88
This benchmarked, updating, output-based allocation of allowances is
designed to prevent leakage, which occurs when in-state businesses leave
the regulating state to go to nonregulating states or when in-state businesses lose market share to out-of-state businesses in nonregulating states. 89 By
requiring emissions reductions that will not force industries to leave the
state, California can achieve emissions reductions with less harm to its
economy. 90 This approach to mitigating leakage, however, significantly
lowers the attainable GHG reductions and potentially mutes the carbon
price. 91
The allowances that are not allocated as aid will be auctioned, and the
revenue generated will be placed in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund
(the “GHG Fund”) account. 92 The GHG Fund will primarily be used to
fund projects that reduce GHG emissions. 93 To the extent feasible, the
GHG Fund is also intended to be used to provide a wide array of other
benefits to California, including improvement of environmental quality,
creation of jobs, assistance with the impacts of climate change, and assistance to disadvantaged communities. 94 CARB is responsible for working
with the Department o� Finance to develop a long-term investment plan in
projects that reduce GHG emissions. 95 The legislature has authorized
85.
86.

Id.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX B: DEV. OF PRODUCT BENCHMARKS FOR
ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION 3 (2011), available at www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/
candtappb.pdf.
87.
ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, supra note 81, at J-21 to -23.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at J-18 to -19.
90.
Id.
91.
See James Bushnell & Yihsu Chen, Regulation, Allocation, and Leakage in Cap-andTrade Markets for CO2 5, 23–24 (Ctr. for the Study o� Energy Mkts., CSEM Working Paper
No. 183, 2009), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/68q5f5td. See generally id. for a
discussion of the impacts of adopting an output-based allowance allocation approach for the
electricity sector.
92.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16428.8 (West 2012).
93.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39712 (West 2013).
94.
Id.
95.
Id. § 39716.
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funding to reduce GHG emissions: (1) “through energy efficiency, clean
and renewable energy generation, distributed renewable energy generation,” improved transmission and storage technology, and other related
projects; (2) “through the development of state-of-the-art systems to move
goods and freight, advanced technology vehicles and vehicle infrastructure,
advanced biofuels, and low-carbon and efficient public transportation”
projects; (3) “associated with water use and supply, land and natural resources conservation and management, forestry, and sustainable
agriculture”; (4) “through strategic planning and development of sustainable infrastructure projects, including . . . transportation and housing”; (5)
“through increased in-state diversion of municipal solid waste from disposal
through waste reduction”; (6) through investments in programs implemented by local agencies and organizations; and (7) through “research,
development, and deployment of innovative technologies, measures, and
practices related to” the projects authorized for funding. 96
The program has a number of cost containment mechanisms that are
designed to keep auction allowance prices at economically affordable levels. 97 First, the use of multi-year compliance periods protects regulated
parties from yearly variations in GHG emissions and provides them with
some flexibility. 98 Second, the program allows covered entities to bank
allowances, which means that they can obtain and store allowances for use
in future compliance periods. 99 This encourages early reduction of emissions because allowances are cheaper and more abundant at the start of the
program. 100 Third, there is an allowance price containment reserve from
which CARB can auction allowances if they become too expensive. 101
Fourth, covered entities are allowed to purchase offset credits from approved programs in the North America, with program eligibility possibly
expanding later. 102 Offset credits are created when projects reduce GHGs
in ways other than emissions reductions in covered sectors, and they can be
used to meet compliance obligations in the same way as allowances. 103 Allowances and offset credits are collectively referred to as compliance
instruments. 104 Simple examples of offset programs include reforestation
projects and restoration of at-risk ecological areas that act as carbon sinks. 105
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. § 39712.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-4.
Id.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95922 (2012).
Id. § 95841.
Id. § 95913; INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-5.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95820–95821, 95972 (2012).
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-44 to -45.
Id. at II-2.
Id. at II-44 to -45.
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When there is sufficient oversight of offset projects to ensure that their
emissions reductions are “real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, [and]
enforceable,” offsets are effective at reducing the costs of, and encouraging
innovative approaches to, reducing GHG emissions. 106 Covered entities
may meet up to 8 percent of their compliance obligations by submitting
offset credits, allowing some flexibility without significantly undermining
the cap. 107
Finally, California’s cap-and-trade program allows for linkage to other
cap-and-trade programs that meet certain quality requirements. 108 Linkage
allows compliance instruments and offset credits from one cap-and-trade
program to be used to meet compliance obligations in a linked cap-andtrade program. 109 This enhances flexibility and cost containment by ensuring that the most efficient reductions of GHG emissions are utilized first,
since there is a much larger pool of potential reductions that can be made. 110
By creating a larger market, it also provides enhanced stability of allowance
prices. 111 California is in the process of approving linkage to Quebec’s capand-trade program, and it is likely that additional partners will be joined in
the future. 112

D. Regulation of the Electricity Sector
Having completed a basic overview of most of California’s cap-andtrade program, we now turn to the energy sector. While the energy sector is
very complex, the big picture is relatively easy to understand. Electricity is
created by generators, which include coal facilities, natural gas facilities,
nuclear facilities, and renewables such as solar and wind. 113 The electricity
is then sold on the electricity market to utilities, marketers, or, in some
cases, directly to large end users. 114 Utilities deliver electricity to a large
number of small end users, such as individual residences and small businesses, over a large area. 115 Marketers purchase electricity from many
different generators and sell parts of the electricity bundle to utilities or
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at II-5; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95854 (2012).
108.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-6; see CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
17, §§ 95940–95943 (2012).
109.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-6.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Luesebrink, supra note 16.
113.
W.M. WARWICK, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES,
DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 3.1–.4 (version 2.0,
rev. 2002).
114.
Id. at 2.1–.3.
115.
Id.
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large end users. 116 Large end users are generally industrial or manufacturing
facilities that use large quantities of electricity. 117
The electricity market is, like other markets, governed by supply and
demand, referred to as generation and load. 118 Generation and load must
always be in balance, such that one never exceeds the other. 119 If an imbalance occurs, the system crashes, and a blackout ensues. 120 The entity
overseeing this balancing is called a balancing authority. 121 Electricity cannot be economically stored at this time, such that the balance must be
achieved through the real-time scheduling of generation and load. 122 Despite the need for balance, particular electricity produced by a particular
generator cannot be directed to a particular consumer. 123 Electricity, which
is a homogeneous stream of electrons, is pooled after it is generated and
placed on the electricity grid, which is the transmission network over which
electricity is sent from generators to load. 124 This allows a unified transmission network, providing the benefits of an economy of scale. 125
The demand for electricity has a predictable cycle: it peaks during the
day, particularly during the summer months, and troughs during the
night. 126 When load is at its lowest, the cheapest and most reliable generators, called baseload generators, operate and sell electricity. 127 Baseload
power is generally supplied by hydropower facilities, nuclear facilities, and
coal facilities, which are cheaper to run for prolonged periods of time. 128
These plants are particularly well suited for supplying baseload power
because they are expensive to ramp up and down (except for hydropower)
but not costly to run continuously. 129 As load increases, additional generators are brought online roughly in order of price until the load is met. 130
The “marginal” generator is the highest cost generator meeting load or the
116.
See INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-20.
117.
See Electricity, WINDOW ON STATE GOVERNMENT, http://www.window.state.tx.us
/specialrpt/energy/uses/electricity.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
118.
DANIEL S. KIRSCHEN & GORAN STRBAC, FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM
ECONOMICS 49–50 (2004).
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards, NORTH AMERICAN
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20
Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf (last updated May 9, 2013).
122.
KIRSCHEN & STRBAC, supra note 118, at 49–50.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.; WARWICK, supra note 113, at 3.5–7.0.
128.
KIRSCHEN & STRBAC, supra note 118, at 49–50; WARWICK, supra note 113, at 3.5–7.0.
129.
KIRSCHEN & STRBAC, supra note 118, at 49–50; WARWICK, supra note 113, at 3.5–7.0.
130.
KIRSCHEN & STRBAC, supra note 118, at 49–50.
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next cheapest one in line to meet load. 131 Gas-fired power plants are usually
dispatched as marginal generators. 132 As load changes over time, the marginal generator and the cost of the electricity also change. 133 Electricity is
bought and sold in megawatts per hour (MWhs) that are delivered over a
certain time period. 134
California’s electricity sector accounts for 25% of the state’s total GHG
emissions, and it is expected to accomplish 40% of the state’s GHG emissions reductions by 2020. 135 California produces approximately 68.5% and
imports 31.5% of its electricity. 136 In-state generation accounts for 44% of
electricity sector GHG emissions, and imported electricity accounts for the
remaining 56% of electricity sector emissions. 137 This section explains how
California is regulating the electricity sector’s emissions under the cap-andtrade program.

1. Regulation of California’s Electricity Sector
While California adopted an output-based allocation approach to regulate most industries, it has not adopted this approach for the electricity
sector. 138 Instead, California adopted a first-jurisdictional-deliverer (FJD)
approach that requires the first entity delivering load to the California
electrical grid, which is the generator of the electricity when generation
occurs in-state, to submit compliance instruments for the GHG emissions
associated with the generation of the electricity if the generating facility
emits 25,000 MTCO2e or more annually. 139
A mixed direct-allocation and auction-based system has been developed
to supply generators with allowances. 140 The allowances will first be allocated to electrical distribution utilities (EDUs), including both publicly and
privately owned utilities. 141 CARB determined the number of allowances it
will allocate to each EDU based on its historical emissions, current generation mix, sales, and efforts at decreasing its emissions since the passage of
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
CPUC/CEC JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 73, at M-9.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19.
Id.
Id. at II-19 to -20.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95811(b), 95812(c)(2) (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF
REASONS, supra note 62, at II-12, II-19 to -20.
140.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-28, II-31 to -32.
141.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX 1: STAFF PROPOSAL FOR 15-DAY
CHANGES TO ADDRESS ELECTRICITY SECTOR ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION 1–6 (2010),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/res1042app1.pdf [hereinafter
STAFF PROPOSAL].
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AB 32. 142 This holistic approach was chosen as a compromise between
distributing allowances solely on the basis o� historical emissions, which
would have rewarded those EDUs that have made the least progress in
reducing emissions, and distributing allowances without regard to historical
emissions, which would have harmed ratepayers. 143
The allowances allocated to the investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are
placed in an account on their behalf, and the allowances in that account are
sold at a blind auction to all generators that need allowances to meet their
compliance obligations. 144 This way IOUs that generate some of their own
electricity are forced to bid for allowances on the same terms as other generators and cannot favor themselves. 145 Publicly owned utilities (POUs)
usually generate all of their own power and do not compete with independent power generators. 146 Therefore, POUs are given the option of either
using their allocated allowances to meet their compliance obligations (for
generation owned by the POU or a joint power authority) or putting their
allowances up for auction under the same terms applied to IOUs. 147 The
revenue from these auctions is to be used exclusively for providing rebates
or customer bill relief to ratepayers to reduce the cap-and-trade program’s
financial impacts on them. 148 If this program were only applied to electricity generated within California, the goals of the cap-and-trade program
would be severely undermined by leakage and resource (or contract) shuffling.

2. The Leakage and Resource Shuffling Problems
When regulations are adopted in one jurisdiction but not others, this
can cause prices and production costs to increase in the regulating jurisdiction relative to prices and production costs in the nonregulating
jurisdictions. 149 This cost differential can lead to leakage, which occurs
when businesses in the regulating jurisdiction move their operations to one
of the nonregulating jurisdictions or lose market share to businesses in the
142.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892 (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra
note 62, at II-32 to -34; STAFF PROPOSAL, supra note 141, at 1–6.
143.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-32 to -34.
144.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892 (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra
note 62, at II-31 to -32.
145.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-31 to -32.
146.
Id.
147.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(b)(2) (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF
supra note 62, at II-31 to -32.
148.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(d) (2012).
149.
LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
APPENDIX H., MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS H-51 (2007), available
at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv3apph.pdf [hereinafter MARKET
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS].
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nonregulating jurisdictions. 150 The practical effect o� leakage in the context
of cap-and-trade programs is that emissions reductions in the regulating
jurisdiction are offset by emissions increases in the nonregulating jurisdictions as production and market share shift to the nonregulating jurisdicjurisdictions. 151 Rather than a reduction in GHG emissions, the effect of
the cap-and-trade program becomes economic harm to the regulating jurisdiction. Thus, in order for a cap-and-trade program to be effective and to
achieve GHG reductions, it must prevent leakage to the greatest extent
possible. 152
Unless California regulates imported electricity, it is at risk for significant emissions leakage that would undermine its program. 153 One study
concluded that California will lose 25% of its emissions reductions in the
electricity sector to leakage even if it regulates imported electricity under
the FJD approach and that California could lose up to 100% of its emissions
reductions in the electricity sector to leakage if it does not regulate imported electricity. 154 Other studies are in accord, predicting a large increase in
imported electricity if California is unable to regulate imports under its
cap-and-trade program. 155 California has already aggressively pursued energy efficiency opportunities, making California’s electricity consumption one
of the lowest in the nation, and reduced the GHG emissions intensity of its
electricity sector, resulting in significantly lower emissions per MWh than
the national average. 156 When combined with the fact that coal accounts for

150.
LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51.
151.
LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51.
152.
LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51.
153.
MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51.
154.
KAREN PALMER, DALLAS BURTRAW & ANTHONY PAUL, ALLOWANCE
ALLOCATION IN A CO2 EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR THE ELECTRICITY
SECTOR IN CALIFORNIA, at iii, 25–26 (Res. for the Future, RFF Discussion Paper 09-41,
2009), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-41.pdf.
155.
See, e.g., Meredith L. Fowlie, Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 72, 101 (2009); Bushnell & Chen,
supra note 91, at 19–22 (even with considerable electricity industry assistance with an updating, output-based, or fuel-based allocation approach, significant leakage will cause California
GHG emissions to decline by six million MTCO2e but regional emissions to decline by
one million MTCO2e); Yihsu Chen, Andrew L. Liu & Benjamin F. Hobbs, Economic and
Emissions Implications of Load-Based, Source-Based and First-Seller Emissions Trading Programs
Under California AB32, 12–13 (Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst., Energy Policy and Econ. Working
Paper No. 022, 2008), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/EPE
_022.pdf (most GHG emissions reductions will be lost to leakage and resource shuffling).
156.
PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 1–3. The average emissions intensity of in-state electricity generation in 2004 was 0.318 MTCO2e, but the average increases to
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very little of in-state electricity generation, this means that additional emissions reductions in California’s electricity sector are likely to be relatively
expensive for in-state generators. 157 By contrast, leakage is a relatively
inexpensive way for businesses to deal with cap-and-trade regulation. 158
Indeed, the RGGI, which auctioned allowances for the nominal sum of
$1.93 in the December 2012 auction, 159 faces estimates o� leakage from 17–
90%, with 50% being a generally accepted estimate, because it has not taken
any action to prevent leakage. 160 California’s required reductions are much
higher, making its cost to businesses much higher.
A second problem that arises when a cap-and-trade program is adopted
in one jurisdiction but not others is resource shuffling, which is a type o�
leakage. 161 In order to avoid compliance obligations for importing electricity
into the regulating jurisdiction, high-emitting generators in the nonregulating jurisdictions simply shift their electricity sales out of the regulating
jurisdiction. 162 Low-emitting generators in the nonregulating jurisdictions
then fill this market share by selling their electricity into the regulating
jurisdiction. 163 While this decreases the emissions associated with electricity
consumed in the regulating jurisdiction, it does not actually reduce emissions overall because the total amount of emissions in both the regulating
and nonregulating jurisdictions remains the same. 164
A number of studies have concluded that California’s cap-and-trade
program is at significant risk for having its emissions reductions eliminated
by resource shuffling. 165 Because there is enough clean electricity generated
in the western United States to meet most of California’s electricity needs,

0.422 MTCO2e when imported electricity is included. The national average was 0.534
MTCO2e. Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Bushnell & Chen, supra note 91, at 20–21.
159.
Auction 18, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/market/
co2_auctions/results/Auction-18 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
160.
PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 24; Ian Sue Wing & Marek Kolodziej,
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Emission Leakage and the Effectiveness of Interstate Border
Adjustments, 3–4, 24 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Regulatory Policy Program
Working Paper RPP-2008-03, 2008), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/rpp/Working%20papers/RPP_2008_03_SueWing.pdf (noting that leakage is likely to be
49–57% despite little required reduction in emissions and low allowance prices).
161.
MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-55.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
See, e.g., id.; James Bushnell, Carla Peterman & Catherine Wolfram, California’s
Greenhouse Gas Policies: How Do They Add Up? 11 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished working
paper) available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/wolfram/Papers/Energy_Journ_908.pdf;
Chen, Liu & Hobbs, supra note 155, at 708–09.
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that electricity could simply be reallocated to California. 166 This would
decrease the emissions intensity of California’s imported electricity while
increasing the emissions intensity of the electricity used in the other western states. 167 If this happens on a large enough scale, the illusory emissions
reductions in the electricity sector could meet the targeted emissions reductions from the entire California program, even though no emissions
reductions would have actually been achieved. 168 While more reductions
could be sought elsewhere, this would significantly impair California’s
ability to reduce GHG emissions because the electricity sector has the
greatest potential for emissions reductions. 169
The Market Advisory Committee that provided recommendations to
CARB, as well as some commentators, have stated that while resource shuffling is a risk, the risk is not as pronounced as those studies indicate. 170 The
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the legislature,
through Senate Bill 1368, have already prohibited long-term contracts with
high-emitting facilities. 171 This resulted in resource shuffling o� loweremission electricity to California and possibly impacted generation-facility
investment decisions in the West. 172
Additionally, only about 44% of out-of-state regional electricity generation is unassigned, or available to be shuffled. 173 Only a small portion of
this electricity is coal-fired, and coal generators are expected to have the
strongest incentives to shuffle contracts. 174 Indeed, a California Energy
Commission study of imported electricity determined that, in the West,
92% of coal generation is owned by utilities and 8% is owned by independent generators in long-term contracts. 175 This coal generation is primarily
used to supply baseload electricity rather than marginal electricity. 176 This
is the case because coal plants are well suited to providing baseload electricity and poorly suited to providing marginal electricity, except when they
166.
James Bushnell, Carla Peterman & Catherine Wolfram, Local Solutions to Global
Problems: Climate Change Policies and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y
175, 188 (2008).
167.
See id.
168.
See id.
169.
See id. at 176.
170.
MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-55;
PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 6–7.
171.
MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-55.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
AL ALVARADO & KAREN GRIFFIN, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, REVISED
METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE THE GENERATION RESOURCE MIX OF CALIFORNIA
ELECTRICITY IMPORTS 4 (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/
CEC-700-2007-007/CEC-700-2007-007.PDF.
176.
Id. at 6–8.
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can do so in addition to supplying mostly baseload electricity. 177 They are
cheap to run continuously (in the absence of internalization of their GHG
costs) and expensive to ramp up or down. 178 The unassigned electricity is
primarily composed of gas-fired generation in the Southwest and a mix of
gas-fired and hydropower generation in the Northwest. 179
Resource shuffling may be further limited by renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs) in other states, which require utilities to use renewable
energy to supply a specified portion of their electricity. 180 RPSs generally
require utilities to obtain more renewable electricity than is currently available, which means that the majority of the renewable energy in the states
that have RPSs may be used to satisfy the RPSs. 181 This is somewhat uncertain because many states allow renewable energy credits (RECs), which are
the certificates used to demonstrate compliance with RPS requirements, to
be unbundled from electricity and still satisfy the RPS requirements, potentially allowing the same electricity to both be used to comply with RPS
requirements in a state other than California and be used to serve California load. 182 California has addressed this concern to some extent by
requiring importers to retire RECs associated with the imported electricity
in order to qualify for zero-emissions treatment. 183
Resource shuffling could become a much larger problem over the
course of the cap-and-trade program as contracts between California purchasers and out-of-state generators expire and high-emitting electricity
currently being imported into California is directed elsewhere, creating an
illusory reduction in emissions. This becomes less of an issue if investors
move toward low-emission generation types as a result of the cap-and-trade
program and if investors believe there is a significant risk that other states
will implement their own cap-and-trade programs. 184

177.
Explainer: Base Load and Peaking Power, KCET.ORG, http://www.kcet.org/news/
rewire/explainers/explainer-base-load-and-peaking-power.html (last visited August 9, 2013).
178.
ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 6–8.
179.
Id. at 32; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-55.
180.
Bushnell, Peterman & Wolfram, supra note 166, at 185–87; Steven Ferrey, Chad
Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125, 158 (2010). For a
general discussion o� RPS programs, see Ferry, Laurent & Ferry, supra, at 144–53.
181.
Bushnell, Peterman & Wolfram, supra note 166, at 186.
182.
This is the case in the Northwest. See ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 27–28.
183.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(3) (2012).
184.
See James Bushnell, The Implementation of California AB 32 and Its Impact on Wholesale Electricity Markets 12 (Ctr. for the Study o� Energy Mkts., CSEM Working Paper 170,
2007), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1qw1c912.
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3. Regulation o� Imported and Exported Electricity
California is regulating imported electricity to accomplish two main
ends: reduce the GHG emissions associated with in-state electricity consumption and prevent leakage and resource shuffling that would undermine
the cap-and-trade program. 185 The FJD approach is being used to determine which entity has a compliance obligation. 186 This is identical to reguregulation of electricity generated in-state because in both cases it is the
party that first delivers electricity to the California grid that has a compliance obligation, although with in-state electricity the obligation will fall on
generators and with out-of-state electricity the obligation will fall on a mix
of generators and marketers. 187 CARB staff specifically chose this approach
to regulate electricity “because it treats all importers and in-state generators
the same.” 188
However, it is not always easy to identify the entity that is functioning
as the FJD. CARB is assigning FJD status to the purchasing-selling entity
listed on the NERC e-Tag 189 that is created when the electricity is delivered
between balancing authority areas, or to the facility operator or scheduling
coordinator if the electricity does not cross balancing authority areas. 190
There are potential problems with using this method, as the California
Independent System Operator (CAISO) balancing authority covers California but extends beyond California’s borders in a few places, such that
delivery of electricity into the CAISO balancing authority may not necessarily mean delivery into California, although CAISO has stated that
delivery to out-of-state interties within its coverage means that the electricity is delivered to California. 191 California plans to use contracts and other
documentation to supplement the NERC e-Tag information in order to
correctly identify the party with compliance obligations. 192

185.
LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51, H-54 to -55.
186.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(b) (2012).
187.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-12.
188.
Id.
189.
A NERC e-tag is an electronic record of the purchase, sale, and transport of
electricity when the electricity moves from one balancing authority to another. Id.
190.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(85) (2012). A balancing authority manages
purchases and sales of electricity to ensure reliability of the electrical grid. Id.
§ 95802(a)(23).
191.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, FINAL
STATEMENT OF REASONS 1461–64, 1473–74, 2078–82 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.
gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/fsor.pdf [hereinafter FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS].
192.
Id. at 1467.
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FIGURE 1. WESTERN ELECTRICITY COORDINATING COUNCIL
BALANCING AUTHORITIES

Note: This figure is taken from Western Interconnection Balancing Authorities, WECC.BIZ,
http://www.wecc.biz/library/WECC%20Documents/Publications/WECC_BA_Map.pdf (last updated
Nov. 27, 2012).

While the point of regulation is the same, the regulatory approach to
determining compliance obligations is different. Imported electricity comes
from two types of sources: specified and unspecified. 193 In order for a generating facility to be considered a specified source of electricity (at least
when the facility is seeking an emission factor lower than the default emission factor discussed below), “[t]he electricity importer must be the facility
operator or have right of ownership or a written power contract, as defined
in MRR section 95102(a), to the amount of electricity claimed and generat193.

INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20.
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ed by the facility or unit claimed” and the electricity must be directly delivered to the California grid. 194 Electricity is directly delivered when: (1)
“[t]he [generating] facility has a first point of interconnection with a California balancing authority”; (2) “[t]he [generating] facility has a first point
of interconnection with distribution facilities used to serve end users within
a California balancing authority area”; (3) “[t]he electricity is scheduled for
delivery from the specified source into a California balancing authority via
a continuous physical transmission path from interconnection of the facility
in the balancing authority in which the facility is located to a sink located in
the state of California”; or (4) “[t]here is an agreement to dynamically
transfer electricity from the facility to a California balancing authority.” 195
The direct delivery requirement was adopted to help prevent resource
shuffling by ensuring that the electricity was actually delivered to California. 196 Additionally, i� RECs were created for the electricity generated,
those RECs must be used for compliance with the California RPS or be
retired. 197
Unspecified sources of electricity are all other sources, primarily “electricity that is not a specified source at the time of entry into the transaction
198
to procure the electricity.” “Unspecified sources contribute to the bulk
system power pool and typically are dispatchable, marginal resources
that do not serve baseload.” 199 Because unspecified electricity cannot be
matched to a specific source, the GHG emissions are unknown. 200 Unspecified sources are almost always the market’s marginal generators, and,
because California does not import much power during off-peak hours, they
are usually the peak-hour marginal generators. 201
Approximately 44 percent of California’s imported electricity is from
unspecified sources. 202 The remaining 56 percent of imported electricity
can be traced to specific facilities whose emissions are known because they
are owned by or in long-term contracts with California purchasers, or because their GHG emissions are reported to the Climate Registry. 203 The
194.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(3) (2012). Qualifying contracts include
power purchase agreements, enabling agreements, and tariff provisions. Id. § 95102(a)(351).
195.
Id. § 95102(a)(125).
196.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 17.
197.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(3)(D) (2012).
198
Id. § 95102(a)(281).
199.
CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATION ORDER
§ 95802(a)(278) (2010), available at www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/finalrev
fro.pdf; see INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, II-19 to -20.
200.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, II-19 to -20.
201.
See ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 6–7, 10, 20.
202.
Id. at 2, 6.
203.
Id.; PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 6–7. The California Climate
Action Registry is a voluntary GHG registry. About, THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.
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tables that follow break down where imported electricity originates and
provide rough estimates of the generation mixes of specified and unspecified electricity imports from each originating region.

TABLE 1. 2005 TOTAL ESTIMATED CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY
IMPORTS (GWHS)
Resource Type
Coal
Hydropower
Natural Gas

NW
1,758
10,723
9,866

Percent
7.9%
48.0%
44.1%

SW
Percent Total
Percent
35,860 54.4%
37,617
42.6%
2,093
3.2%
12,816
14.5%
20,83
31.6%
30,705 34.8
9
Nuclear
0
0.0%
7,074
10.7%
7,074
8.0%
Renewables
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
Total Imports (firm and system) 22,347 100.0%
65,866 100.0%
46,563 100.0%
Note: This table is adapted and taken from ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at A-3
tbl.A-3. Southwest (SW) is defined as including Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Colorado. Id. at 25. Northwest (NW) is defined as including Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and
Montana, and British Columbia hydropower. Id. at 24.

TABLE 2. 2005 ESTIMATED SOUTHWEST IMPORT RESOURCE MIX
IMPORTS (GWHS)
Percent
Mix*
Coal
34,992
868
35,860
2.4%
54.4%
Hydropower
2,093
0
2,093
0.0%
3.2%
Natural Gas
0
20,839
20,839
100.0%
31.6%
Nuclear
7,074
0
7,074
0.0%
10.7%
Renewables
0
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
Total Imports
44,159
21,707
65,866
33.0%
...
Note: This table is adapted and taken from ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at A-2 to A-3
tbls.A-2 & A-3. *Numbers do not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Resource Type

Specified

Unspecified

Total

Unspecified Percent

TABLE 3. 2005 ESTIMATED NORTHWEST IMPORT RESOURCE MIX
IMPORTS (GWHS)
Resource Type
Coal
Hydropower
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Renewables
Total Imports

Specified
900
0
0
0
0
900

Unspecified
858
10,723
9,866
0
0
21,447

Total
1,758
10,723
9,866
0
0
22,347

Unspecified Percent
48.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
96.0%

Percent Mix
7.9%
48.0%
44.1%
0.0%
0.0%
...

theclimateregistry.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). The Climate Registry collects
GHG information throughout North America from both voluntary and mandatory
of GHG emissions.
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Note: This table is adapted and taken from ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at A-2 to A-3
tbls.A-2 & A-3.

More recent estimates, for 2012, place the percentage of imported electricity from unspecified sources at 48.1 percent, with the remaining 51.9
percent being specified imports. 204 These more recent estimates indicate
that the amount of specified imports coming from coal have decreased by
almost half, while imports in other, lower emission categories have increased substantially, indicating either resource shuffling or a shift toward
lower-emission generation sources. 205
Out-of-state facilities that meet the requirements to be specified
sources and are approved by CARB are treated the same as in-state facilities. Importers of electricity from these specified sources only have
compliance obligations for electricity from facilities that emit 25,000
MTCO2e or more annually and must submit compliance instruments to
cover the actual emissions generated for each MWh of imported electricity. 206
Importers of electricity from unspecified sources are subject to compliance obligations for all imported electricity, regardless of whether or not the
generating facility emits 25,000 MTCO2e or more annually. 207 Because this
electricity cannot be matched to any particular generator, a default emission
factor is being used to calculate the compliance obligations for unspecified
electricity. 208 The default emission factor used to determine compliance
obligations for this electricity is calculated “using the Final WCI Default
Emission Factor Calculator created by CPUC staff, vetted through the
WCI Electricity Team, and adopted by the WCI Partners.” 209 The default
emission factor is the average emission rate of electricity from the marginal,
unassigned facilities in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council
(WECC) area during 2006, 2007, and 2008. 210 CARB defined marginal
facilities “as facilities with capacity factors lower than 60 percent.” 211
204.
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, Total Electricity System Power, CA.GOV, http://energy
almanac.ca.gov/electricity/total_system_power.html (last updated August 1, 2013).
205.
See id.
206.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95812(a), 95812(c)(2)(B)(1) (2012).
207.
Id. § 95812(c)(2)(B)(2).
208.
Id. § 95111(b)(1).
209.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISIONS TO THE REGULATION FOR MANDATORY
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF
REASONS FOR RULEMAKING 167 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/
ghg2010/ghgisor.pdf [hereinafter MRR INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS].
210.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 602–03. WECC coordinates
the dispatch of electricity over the western electricity grid. MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-63. It includes parts o� fourteen western states
and part of Canada. Id.
211.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 602–03. The capacity factor is
the ratio of the actual power output of a facility over a period of time and the potential
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Marginal facilities are primarily gas-fired generators, although hydropower
provides some marginal electricity as well in the WECC region. 212 The
default emission factor is initially set at 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh, 213 which is
less than the average emission rate of a gas-fired facility, which is approximately 0.515 MTCO2e/MWh. 214 The compliance obligations for
unspecified electricity are then calculated by multiplying the default emission factor and the MWhs imported. 215
In addition, importers from both specified and unspecified sources
have compliance obligations for transmission losses. 216 To account for
transmission losses, specified sources have compliance obligations for the
amount of electricity imported as measured at the generating facility’s
busbar (i.e., prior to transmission across the grid). 217 When the amount of
imported electricity as measured at the busbar is unknown, or when the
electricity is imported from an unspecified source, compliance obligations
are increased by 2 percent to account for transmission line losses. 218
California provides some importers with an “RPS adjustment” to their
compliance obligations when they import unspecified electricity from certain renewable energy generators in order to align the RPS and cap-andtrade programs and reduce compliance costs. 219 In order to qualify for an
RPS adjustment, (1) the renewable electricity must not qualify as specified
electricity (in that it must not be directly delivered); (2) the FJD must have
contract or ownership rights to procure the electricity or must have a contract to import the electricity on behalf of a party with such rights; (3) the
RECs generated by the electricity must be used to comply with California’s
RPS in the same year in which the electricity is imported; and (4) the
electricity must be from one of the renewable generators that qualify under
California’s RPS. 220 While most renewable energy generators are eligible
under California’s RPS, a substantial minority of renewable energy generators are excluded, including certain hydroelectric facilities. 221 If the above
output of the facility had it operated at full capacity during that time. Frequently Asked
Questions: What Is a Capacity Factor?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=187&t=3 (last updated May 13, 2013).
212.
Kyle Siler-Evans, Inês Lima Azevedo & M. Granger Morgan, Marginal Emissions
Factors for the U.S. Electricity System, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECHNOL. 4742, 4743–44 (2012).
213.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95111(b)(1), 95852(b)(1)(B) (2012).
214.
Clean Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY http://www.epa.gov/clean
energy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated June 20, 2013).
215.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95111(b)(1), 95852(b)(1)(B) (2012).
216.
Id. § 95111(b)(1)–(2).
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
219.
Id. § 95852(b)(4).
220.
Id.
221.
Id. § 95802(a)(86); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(e) (West 2012). Most types of
renewable generation are eligible, including “biomass, solar thermal, photovoltaic, wind,
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requirements are met, the importer receives a compliance credit equal to
the number of qualifying MWhs multiplied by the default emission factor. 222 This basically means that the electricity is considered as coming from
the renewable generator and is given its true emissions profile, rather than
being treated as unspecified and assigned the default emission factor. This
provision primarily applies to renewable electricity that must be firmed and
shaped before being delivered to California, as that electricity is not directly delivered and therefore does not qualify as specified electricity. 223
In addition to imposing compliance obligations for the emissions associated with imported electricity as discussed above, CARB specifically
prohibits resource shuffling in the cap-and-trade regulations and requires
importers to certify that they have not engaged in resource shuffling. 224
CARB has defined resource shuffling as “any plan, scheme, or artifice to
receive credit based on emissions reductions that have not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California grid.” 225 California has
indicated that this provision is intended to avoid three primary types of
resource shuffling: (1) changing unspecified sources to specified sources
only when a lower emission factor is obtained (“cherry picking”); (2) replacing purchases from high-emitting facilities with purchases from existing
low-emitting facilities to obtain a lower emission factor (“facility swapping”); and (3) changing a high-emission source from specified to
unspecified to obtain a lower emission factor (“laundering”). 226 The contours of this prohibition are not yet clear, and stakeholders have requested
that CARB develop a more concrete method of determining when a covered
entity has engaged in resource shuffling. Given the complexity of the electricity market, there is constant shifting of resources that makes it difficult
geothermal, fuel cells using renewable fuels, small hydroelectric generation of 30 megawatts
or less, digester gas, municipal solid waste conversion, landfill gas, ocean wave, ocean thermal, or tidal current.” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25741(a)(1) (West 2012). Large hydropower
facilities are excluded under the definition, and there are further exceptions for small hydropower. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(e) (West 2012).
222.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(4)(c) (2012).
223.
“Firming” is the process by which a backup generation source is used to supplement the output of an intermittent resource to ensure that the total energy provided is
sufficient to meet customer load. “Shaping” is the turning down of a supplemental generation source when the intermittent source is generating sufficient energy to meet customer
load. SARA KAMINS & JACK STODDARD, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD (Apr. 2, 2008), available at ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.gov/
oga/2010%20position%20letters/presentations/090402%20CPUC%20Presentation%20on%20
Renewable%20Energy%20Credits.pdf.
224.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2) (2012).
225.
Id. § 95802(a)(251).
226.
CAL. AIR RES. BD., COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION FOR FIRST DELIVERERS OF
ELECTRICITY 10 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/082011/
cap-trade-presentation.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION].
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to determine when covered entities are intentionally shuffling resources for
the primary purpose of avoiding compliance obligations. In response to
pressure from stakeholders and a member of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), CARB suspended this prohibition for the first eighteen months of trading to determine if it is necessary and to determine how
to clearly define what actions constitute resource shuffling. 227
A simple example will help to illustrate how compliance obligations
will vary among facilities under California’s program. Assume that we have
three 100 MW-capacity facilities that continuously run at 50 percent capacity to generate 438,000 MWhs of electricity each year that is sold to
meet California load: a solar facility, Solar, that emits 0 MTCO2e/MWh; a
gas-fired facility, Gas, that emits 0.515 MTCO2e/MWh; and a coal facility,
Coal, that emits 1.020 MTCO2e/MWh. 228 We also assume that compliance
instruments cost $30 apiece 229 and allow a facility to emit 1 MTCO2e. Solar
will have no compliance obligations when it is located in-state or is a specified out-of-state source. If Solar is located out-of-state and is an unspecified
source, it will be deemed to emit 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh, creating compliance obligations that would cost approximately $5.6 million a year. Gas
would have $6.8 million worth of compliance obligations when it is located
in-state or is a specified out-of-state source, but it would have $5.6 million
worth of compliance obligations if it is located out-of-state and is an unspecified source. Coal would have $13.4 million worth of compliance
obligations when it is located in-state or is a specified out-of-state source,
but it would have only $5.6 million worth of compliance obligations if it is
an out-of-state unspecified source.
The decision to regulate imported electricity in this manner appears to
be based on two main considerations: the difficulty of tracking imports to
their source and the need to avoid leakage and resource shuffling. It may be
practically impossible to track a large percentage of electricity imports back
to the facilities from which they originated. 230 Electricity is bought and sold
227.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX A: WHAT IS RESOURCE SHUFFLING?
(2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/appendix_a.pdf; Rory
Carroll, California Suspends CO2 Market Rule on Electricity Imports, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2012,
4:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/20/us-california-carbon-idUSBRE87
J06B20120820.
228.
Clean Energy, supra note 214.
229.
While the auction reserve price is initially set at ten dollars per allowance, it is
likely that demand will drive the price higher, especially in later years. CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
17, § 95911(c)(1) (2012). The clearing price at the February 2013 auction for 2013 allowances
was $13.62. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD QUARTERLY
AUCTION 2, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/
february_2013/auction2_feb2013_summary_results_report.pdf.
230.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20; MARKET
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-53 to -54.
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many times on the wholesale electricity markets, and there is a great deal of
anonymity involved in the transactions. 231 CARB staff, New Jersey regulators, and commentators considering options for preventing leakage have all
concluded that it cannot be done effectively. 232 If the electricity cannot be
traced to a particular source, it is impossible to determine what emissions
are associated with the electricity or whether the generating facility had
annual emissions of 25,000 MTCO2e or more. It is important to note that
there is no programmatic way to avoid this problem if imported electricity
is to be regulated. Other approaches, including a carbon tax or a load-based
approach, which would require load-serving entities (LSEs, which are basically utilities) to account for the emissions of their purchases, 233 would also
require that a default emission factor be applied to imported electricity. The
LSE approach would, however, apply a default emission factor to both
domestic and imported electricity. 234
California has not provided an exception for exported electricity in its
cap-and-trade program, which means that exporters will face the same
compliance obligations as intrastate sellers and similar compliance obligations to importers from specified sources. California is providing only a
limited adjustment for exports when electricity is simultaneously imported
and exported. 235 In order to qualify, the importer and exporter must be the
same entity and the purchase and sale must occur within the same hour. 236
If these requirements are met, then the importer/exporter is given a credit
equal to the lowest quantity of imports or exports multiplied against the
231.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20.
232.
In re a Green House Gas Emission Portfolio Standard and Other Regulatory
Mechanisms to Mitigate Leakage, No. EO08030150, 20–21 (N.J. Bd. o� Pub. Utils., Dec. 17,
2008) (order), available at http://legalectric.org/f/2009/11/leakage-12-17-08-8i.pdf (“In a
restructured electricity market like New Jersey, most e1ectricity purchases in the regional
wholesale market do not specify the generation facility from which the electricity will be
supplied. Even if the contract does identify a specific facility, the supplier will likely vary
output from different facilities and even from different suppliers on the basis of the wholesale market economics to maximize financial returns.” This was in reference to a carbon
adder, which requires a utility add a shadow price for the emissions associated with the
electricity. If a carbon adder is too difficult to put in place, it is definitely not possible to get
an accurate emissions estimate that can be used to impose compliance obligations); INITIAL
STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20; see also ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra
note 175, at 30 (GHG emissions of unspecified sources must be estimated); MARKET
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-53 to -55 (concluding
that about half of imported electricity will need to be assigned a default emission factor);
Bushnell, supra note 184, at 15 (concluding that imported electricity not connected to a
contract would have to be assigned a default emission factor); PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL,
supra note 154, at 6–7 (same).
233.
Bushnell, supra note 184, at 8–9.
234.
Id. at 8–9, 13–14.
235.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(5) (2012).
236.
Id.
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lowest emission factor of any portion of the exports or imports. 237 While
this gives the importer/exporter some credit when there is essentially no
import or export (because the net value of either imports or exports will be
zero), the credit is designed to be the lowest possible. California therefore
is not favoring its in-state generators to enhance their competitiveness in
the interstate markets.
In 2015, California will expand the cap-and-trade program to cover
more entities and emissions. 238 Importers from specified sources of electricity will be subject to compliance obligations for all emissions associated
with the imported electricity, even if the generating facility emits less than
25,000 MTCO2e per year. 239 Additionally, the program will cover fuel
suppliers when 25,000 MTCO2e would result from full combustion or
oxidation of the quantities o� fuels that are imported or delivered to California. 240 California has chosen not to reduce the threshold for energy
facilities located in California on the basis that they will be indirectly covered when fuel suppliers are regulated. 241

II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A BARRIER TO
REGULATING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from discriminating
against, extraterritorially regulating, or unduly burdening interstate commerce. California is regulating both its domestic economy and goods that
travel in interstate commerce under the cap-and-trade program, making a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge likely. This Part explains the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.

A. The Dormant Commerce Clause: Origin and Overview
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
“Congress shall have [the p]ower . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States.” 242 The Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of
power to Congress that does not expressly limit the power of states to
regulate interstate commerce. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted it to include such a limitation. 243 This limitation, referred to as the
237.
Id.
238.
Id. § 95812(d).
239.
Id.
240.
Id.
241.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-20.
242.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
243.
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 337 (2007); see also H.P. Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949).
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dormant Commerce Clause, 244 has been interpreted broadly 245 but does not
prohibit all state regulation of interstate commerce. 246 Absent federal
preemption, states have traditionally been allowed to exercise their police
powers, including the power to regulate air quality and GHG emissions, 247
to “promot[e] the health and welfare” of their citizens. 248 The question is
what limits the dormant Commerce Clause places on otherwise legitimate
exercises of state power.
Courts have developed a complex analytical framework for determining
when a state’s exercise of its police power violates the dormant Commerce
Clause. 249 A court will first determine whether the state law discriminates
against interstate commerce 250 or regulates activities beyond its borders
(extraterritorially). 251 A law discriminates against interstate commerce if it
is facially discriminatory 252 or if it is facially neutral but discriminatory in
its purpose or effects. 253 A state law falling into one of these categories is
subjected to strict scrutiny that can only be overcome by a showing that the
state has no less discriminatory means to advance a legitimate local purpose. 254 If the state law regulates in- and out-of-state activities
evenhandedly, it is subjected to the Pike balancing test, which weighs the
state interests involved against the burden placed on interstate commerce. 255 These tests are discussed in more detail infra.

B. The Policies Underlying the Dormant Commerce Clause
In examining whether a state law violates the dormant Commerce
Clause, it is helpful to understand the reasons why the doctrine was created.

244.
See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 337.
245.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978) (“All objects of interstate
trade merit [dormant] Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the
outset.”).
246.
Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 349–50 (1977); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City o� Detroit, 360 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1960).
247.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (states can use their police
power to reduce in-state GHG emissions unless there is an independent limitation on their
ability to do so).
248.
Huron, 360 U.S. at 442–43.
249.
See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25
ENVTL. F. 50, 53–55 (describing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
250.
See, e.g., Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
251.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989).
252.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
253.
Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350–52 (1977).
254.
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 338–39 (2007).
255.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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Two main policy rationales are used to justify its existence. 256 The central
rationale is the need to prevent the “evils of ‘economic isolation’ and protectionism,” although the courts seek to do so without unduly hindering the
ability of the states to manage local affairs and to “safeguard the health and
safety of [their] people.” 257 The Framers held “the conviction that in order
to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” 258 They believed that free trade among the states was critical to the nation’s success
and wanted to limit the ability of states to create trade barriers to shortsightedly protect their local economies at the expense of the nation’s
economy as a whole. 259 If one state implemented discriminatory laws, others would likely retaliate by doing the same. 260
The Supreme Court has used this policy underpinning to justify strict
limits on the power of states to burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce, 261 although not without sharp criticism from proponents of
strong federalism and judicial deference to elected officials. 262 In recent
256.
See Patricia Weisselberg, Comment, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West:
Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants
Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 207–08 (2007).
257.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623–24 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,
527 (1935)).
258.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); see Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James
Madison). The Framers apparently had good reason to fear divisive burdens on interstate
commerce: the federal government had been unable to prevent discriminatory treatment,
trade barriers, and ill will under the Articles of Confederation. Brannon P. Denning, Correspondence, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Prolegomenon to a Defense, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1801, 1804–06 (2004).
259.
H.P. Hood & Sons Co. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533–35 (1949); Weisselberg,
supra note 256, at 207–08. “In one o� his letters, Madison wrote that the Commerce Clause
‘grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the nonimporting, and
was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General
Government.’” W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (quoting 3 M.
FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1911)).
260.
C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
261.
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194–96 (striking down independently
constitutional aspects of a state law that in combination formed a tax and subsidy scheme by
taxing all milk sellers and using the proceeds to subsidize only in-state sellers).
262.
See id. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The wisdom of a messianic insistence
on a grim sink-or-swim policy o� laissez-faire economics would be debatable had Congress
chosen to enact it; but Congress has done nothing of the kind. It is the Court which has
imposed the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which bodes ill for the
values o� federalism which have long animated our constitutional jurisprudence.”); C & A
Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 424–25 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“No more than the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Commerce Clause ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics . . .
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years, the resurgence o� federalism and the appointment of its proponents
to the Court have led to a constriction of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine and an expansion of its exceptions. 263 The Court has become more
reluctant to substitute its economic judgments for those of elected state
officials or otherwise interfere with their ability to further legitimate local
ends. 264
The second main rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause is representation reinforcement. 265 When a state passes a law that affects its
citizens, the elected officials responsible for the law can be held accountable
by those citizens through the political process. They can lobby the officials
to change the law or simply vote them out of office. As the Court has recognized, however, “when the regulation is of such a character that its
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is
not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state.” 266 In many cases, one could expect those in-state interests capable o�
holding elected officials accountable to actually encourage the passage o�
laws that discriminatorily burden out-of-state competitors in order to enhance their ability to capture in-state market share. 267 I� burdens on out-ofstate competitors were combined with benefits to in-state interests, 268 a
state could significantly advance the interests of in-state actors at the expense of the national economy and solidarity.
[or] embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire.’ The
dormant Commerce Clause does not ‘protect the particular structure or methods of operation in a[ny] . . . market.’ The only right to compete that it protects is the right to compete
on terms independent of one’s location.” (citations omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) and Exxon Corp. v. Governor o� Md., 437
U.S. 117, 127 (1978))).
263.
Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 345 (2008) (“the Framers’ distrust of
economic Balkanization was limited by their federalism favoring a degree o� local autonomy”); see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 345 (2007) (creating a new exception allowing state entities to severely burden interstate commerce to reap benefits for themselves); Stephen M. Johnson, From Climate Change
and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 565, 573 (2011) (“The Court’s expansion of state power at the expense o�
federal power extends beyond the Commerce Clause, though. In fact, during the 2009
Supreme Court term, in every environmental case where federalism concerns were implicated, the Court ruled in favor of state or local governments.”).
264.
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343 (“The dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving
license for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake, and what activities must be the province of private market
competition.”).
265.
See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989); Weisselberg, supra note 256, at 207–08.
266.
S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938).
267.
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200–01.
268.
See id.
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C. State Laws That Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce
The first step in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is to determine
whether a state law discriminates against interstate commerce. 269 As a
threshold matter, the entities allegedly being treated differently must be
similarly situated. 270
[I]n the absence of actual or prospective competition between the
supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a single market there
can be no local preference, whether by express discrimination
against interstate commerce or undue burden upon it, to which the
dormant Commerce Clause may apply. The dormant Commerce
Clause protects markets and participants in markets, not taxpayers as
such. 271
If the parties are similarly situated, the court proceeds to determine if
the state law discriminates against the out-of-state parties. There are two
primary categories of discriminatory state laws. 272 First, there are facially
discriminatory state laws that explicitly draw a distinction between in-state
and out-of-state entities in order to subject them to different treatment,
benefitting the former while burdening the latter. 273
Importantly, it does not matter at what point in the chain of commerce
the discriminatory law intervenes: “For over 150 years, [the Supreme
Court’s] cases have rightly concluded that the imposition of a differential
burden on any part of the stream of commerce—from wholesaler to retailer
to consumer—is invalid, because a burden placed at any point will result in
a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer.” 274 Nor does it matter if the
discrimination is slight: “where discrimination is patent . . . neither a widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to outof-state competitors need be shown.” 275 However, “[t]he Commerce Clause
269.
Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008).
270.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town o� Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 582 n.16 (1997);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).
271.
Gen. Motors, 519 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
272.
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 249, at 54.
273.
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 575–76.
274.
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 202 (1994).
275.
New Energy Co. o� Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988) (noting that an
Ohio tax exemption that only applied to ethanol produced in Ohio only benefitted one instate and burdened one out-of-state ethanol producer while striking it down). Another
example: The state of Oregon had applied a $2.25 surcharge on the in-state disposal of waste
generated outside Oregon. A Supreme Court majority, over a vigorous dissent, held that the
law was discriminatory on its face even though the surcharge increased the average out-ofstate waste generator’s weekly bill by an estimated $0.14. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o�
Envtl. Quality, Waste Sys., 511 U.S. 93, 96 (1994).
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does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage
in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the
State’s regulation of interstate commerce.” 276
Second, there are facially neutral laws that discriminate against interstate commerce in their purpose 277 or effects. 278 The court assesses
independently the purpose of the law; it is not bound by either legislative
findings and declarations of purpose or determinations by state courts. 279
The court independently discerns the purpose from the statute as a whole,
and “context is a critically important interpretive tool.” 280 When considering whether a state law has discriminatory effects, the court assesses the
law’s effects on in-state and out-of-state activities to determine if it favors
in-state activities by raising the costs for out-of-state businesses disproportionately 281 or by eliminating competitive advantages enjoyed by out-ofstate businesses as a result of their place of origin. 282 Some courts have held
that this competitive advantage can be that out-of-state parties are not
subject to regulations that disadvantage in-state parties, at least if different
laws provide and take away the advantage, such that elimination of the law
removing the advantage would not also necessarily eliminate the law
providing the advantage. 283
The result can be clear when the challenged law is alleged to have discriminatory effects on interstate commerce. 284 In Hunt v. Washington State
276.
New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
277.
There is some uncertainty regarding whether a protectionist purpose, without
more, is sufficient to render a state law unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937) (stating that “motives
alone will seldom, if ever, invalidate a tax that apart from its motives would be recognized as
lawful”); Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2005) (“While courts
often recite this test, there is some reason to question whether a showing of discriminatory
purpose alone will invariably suffice to support a finding of constitutional invalidity under
the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (citations omitted); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City o�
Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1013 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“In no Commerce Clause case cited or
disclosed by research has a statute or regulation been invalidated solely because of the
legislators’ alleged discriminatory motives.”). A discriminatory purpose is still valuable for a
party challenging a state law because, when combined with discriminatory effects, it brings
the case more solidly within the protectionist conduct that the dormant Commerce Clause is
intended to curtail.
278.
See Gov’t Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1277–78 (1992).
279.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
280.
Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 430 F.3d at 37.
281.
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
282.
Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 261–
62 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 580 (1986)).
283.
Id. at 263–67.
284.
The lower courts have had some difficulty with this prong of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 264 (“courts have struggled with . . . the difficulty in examining laws
which do not facially discriminate against out-of-state interests under [d]ormant Commerce
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Apple Advertising Commission, Washington apple growers challenged a North
Carolina law that prohibited the use of state quality-grade labels on apples
shipped into or sold in the state in closed containers. 285 The Supreme
Court held that this discriminated against Washington apple growers to the
benefit o� North Carolina growers for three reasons. 286 First, Washington
growers had to develop special procedures for serving the North Carolina
market because their apples were normally placed in containers already
labeled with the Washington grade. 287 Second, Washington growers had
developed a reputable grading system that marked their apples as superior,
giving them competitive and economic advantages that were eliminated by
the law. 288 Third, since consumers would no longer be able to differentiate
between the apples, preventing labeling unfairly leveled the field for North
Carolina growers by allowing their lower quality apples to compete with the
higher quality Washington apples. 289 While there was evidence of a discriminatory purpose, such a purpose was not necessary to invalidate the
law. 290
Other times the result is less clear but quite sensible. In Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, the Court upheld a Maryland law that prohibited
petroleum producers or refiners from operating any retail gas stations in the
state. 291 At the time, “no petroleum products [were] produced or refined in
Maryland,” meaning that the burden of the prohibition fell entirely on outof-state entities. 292 The Court concluded that this was irrelevant because
other out-of-state entities were still competing with in-state entities. 293
Absent proof of a shift of market share to in-state interests as a result of the
law, there was no discrimination. 294
This result may be due in part to the level of generality at which the
Court viewed the relevant classes o� businesses. At a high level, looking at
the entities that wished to operate retail gasoline stations as a single class,
the Maryland law appears discriminatory because it prohibited only out-ofstate entities from operating gas stations. However, when the class is
Clause jurisprudence. When does a simple economic advantage rise to the level of [a] competitive advantage, within the heightened scrutiny context?”) (quoting Cloverland-Green
Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., No. 1:CV-99-487, 2005 WL 6363889, at *8 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 30, 2005)).
285.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337–38.
286.
Id. at 350–52.
287.
Id. at 350–51.
288.
Id. at 351.
289.
Id. at 351–52.
290.
Id. at 352.
291.
Exxon Corp. v. Governor o� Md., 437 U.S. 117, 119–21 (1978).
292.
Id. at 123.
293.
Id. at 125–26.
294.
Id.
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viewed at a low level of generality as consisting only of producers and
refiners of petroleum, the law did not discriminate because no in-state
members of that class were benefitted at the expense of the out-of-state
members of that class. This makes sense: the dormant Commerce Clause
protects markets and competition between similar classes of participants in
markets rather than particular entities. 295 Because other out-of-state entities
were able to compete with local ones, it did not matter that a class of the
potential competitors was eliminated, even though the class eliminated was
arguably the most dangerous to in-state interests.
An important but somewhat more complicated situation arises when
the state develops a tax-and-subsidy scheme. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, Massachusetts imposed a tax assessment on all milk sold to Massachusetts retailers. 296 The proceeds from this tax were then distributed to
Massachusetts dairy farmers to subsidize their incomes and keep them in
business because they could not profitably produce milk at the federally
guaranteed minimum milk price. 297 “The pricing order thus allow[ed] Massachusetts dairy farmers who produce at higher cost to sell at or below the
price charged by lower cost out-of-state producers.” 298 This effect was the
admitted purpose of the law: “Regionally, the industry is in serious trouble
and ultimately, a federal solution will be required. In the meantime, we
must act on the state level to preserve our local industry.” 299
The Supreme Court had no trouble concluding that this was discriminatory and striking down the law. 300 The law had the same effect as a tariff,
“ ‘neutraliz[ing] advantages belonging to the place of origin.’ ” 301 In reaching
its decision, the Court rejected several arguments advanced by Massachusetts. 302 The most important argument that the State made was that because
each part of the program—the state subsidy and the nondiscriminatory
tax—was independently constitutional, the program as a whole must also be
constitutional. 303 “In effect, respondent argues, if the State may impose a
valid tax on dealers, it is free to use the proceeds of the tax as it chooses;
and if it may independently subsidize its farmers, it is free to finance the
subsidy by means of any legitimate tax.” 304 While a subsidy funded out of
295.
See id. at 127–28; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300 (1997).
296.
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188 (1994).
297.
Id. at 188–90.
298.
Id. at 194–95.
299.
Id. at 190 (quoting Joint Appendix at 31, W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. 186 (declaration of state of emergency made by Jonathan Healy, Commissioner o� Massachusetts
Department o� Food and Agriculture)).
300.
See id. at 194–96.
301.
Id. at 196 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
302.
Id. at 198–205.
303.
Id. at 198.
304.
Id. at 198–99.
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the general fund is normally acceptable, 305 the scheme established by Massachusetts was unconstitutional because it burdened out-of-state producers
while benefitting in-state producers. 306 The Court explained why this
scheme was particularly dangerous:
[W]hen a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of
the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the
in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has
been mollified by the subsidy. So, in this case, one would ordinarily
have expected at least three groups to lobby against the order premium, which, as a tax, raises the price (and hence lowers demand)
for milk: dairy farmers, milk dealers, and consumers. But because
the tax was coupled with a subsidy, one of the most powerful of
these groups, Massachusetts dairy farmers, instead of exerting their
influence against the tax, were in fact its primary supporters. 307
If the court determines that a law is discriminatory, it is subjected to
strict scrutiny and a virtually per se rule of invalidity. 308 The burden shifts
to the State to show that the law “advances a legitimate local purpose that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 309 The Court has commented that “[t]his is perhaps just another way
of saying that what may appear to be a ‘discriminatory’ provision in the
constitutionally prohibited sense—that is, a protectionist enactment—may
on closer analysis not be so. However it be put, the standards for such
justification are high.” 310
It appears that only one discriminatory state law has ever been upheld
by the Supreme Court under this test, illustrating how important it is for

305.
New Energy Co. o� Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (“Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory
taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.”); see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 809 (1977) (stating that the state can subsidize its local industries); Brian C.
Newberry, Recent Decision, Constitutional Law—Taking the Dormant Commerce Clause Too
Far?—West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994), 69 TEMP. L. REV. 547, 555
(1996).
306.
W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199.
307.
Id. at 200–01. Recent cases are in accord. See, e.g., Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Kawamura, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1196–99 (2004) (striking down a milk regulation that required instate processors who purchased milk from out-of-state producers to contribute to a milk
that distributed money to in-state producers).
308.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town o� Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997).
309.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994); Chemerinsky et al., supra note 249, at 54.
310.
New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
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states to avoid having their laws characterized as discriminatory. 311 In
Maine v. Taylor, Maine passed a discriminatory law banning the importation o� baitfish. 312 To justify the ban, Maine argued that the importation o�
baitfish could introduce harmful, non-native fish parasites and invasive
species. 313 Maine further argued that this legitimate local purpose could not
be achieved by anything less than a complete ban because there were no
effective testing procedures for parasites and no way to sift through imports
to remove invasive species. 314
In response, the challenger argued that Maine did not have a legitimate
local purpose because there was insufficient evidence that the parasites were
harmful and there was no risk from invasive species because modern baitfish hatcheries were able to prevent contamination of their stocks. 315 The
challenger also argued that there were less discriminatory alternatives because Maine could employ inspection techniques to prevent introduction of
parasites or invasive species, as it had with other types o� fish. 316 It could
also have limited which out-of-state hatcheries were authorized to sell baitfish into Maine. 317
The evidence in the district court was not unequivocal, but the district
court concluded that Maine’s evidence carried the day:
First, the court found that Maine ‘clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation o� live bait fish,’
because ‘substantial uncertainties’ surrounded the effects that baitfish parasites would have on the State’s unique population of wild
fish, and the consequences of introducing nonnative species were
similarly unpredictable. Second, the court concluded that less discriminatory means of protecting against these threats were
currently unavailable, and that, in particular, testing procedures for
baitfish parasites had not yet been devised. Even if procedures of
this sort could be effective, the court found that their development
probably would take a considerable amount of time. 318

311.
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 582 n.16 (stating that, as of approximately 1997, only one state law had ever been upheld under this test and citing Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)); Chemerinsky et. al, supra note 249, at 54 (citing Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131).
312.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137–38.
313.
Id. at 140–42.
314.
Id.
315.
Id.
316.
Id.
317.
Id.
318.
Id. at 142–43 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Taylor,
585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984)).
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The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s findings accepting Maine’s
evidence and its conclusion that Maine had met the test. 319
Two aspects of the case support Maine’s argument that it had no less
discriminatory alternatives. First, it looked doubtful whether the hatchery
techniques that the challenger claimed were safe actually worked, as his
intercepted shipment had at least two of the three types of parasites and a
variety of invasive species. 320 Second, significant practical difficulties accompanied inspection: it would be difficult to accomplish before the
baitfish perished, and it was reliant on random sampling, as the fish had to
be killed to be inspected, that did not guarantee that a shipment was free of
parasites or invasive species. 321
Critically, however, Maine had been using inspections instead o� bans
to control similar problems with other freshwater fish imports, potentially
giving Maine a less discriminatory alternative if it could develop sufficient
inspections for baitfish. 322 Indeed, this was the grounds on which the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated the law. 323 Ultimately, the case
turned on the current unavailability of the inspection and testing procedures necessary to prevent the introduction of parasites and invasive
species. 324 The Supreme Court agreed:
[T]he “abstract possibility” of developing acceptable testing procedures, particularly when there is no assurance as to their
effectiveness, does not make those procedures an “[available] . . .
nondiscriminatory [alternative]” . . . . A State must make reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its
borders, but it is not required to develop new and unproven means
of protection at an uncertain cost. 325
Thus, a state must have currently available nondiscriminatory alternatives, or possibly easily developed alternatives that are relatively certain to
work before it will fail the test, 326 and, as in other contexts, the findings o�
fact of the district court may be outcome determinative.
319.
Id. at 144–46.
320.
Id. at 143 n.15.
321.
Id. at 141–42.
322.
Id. at 144.
323.
Id. (noting that the court of appeals had “found it ‘difficult to reconcile’ Maine’s
claim that it could not rely on sampling and inspection with the State’s reliance on similar
procedures in the case of other freshwater fish”).
324.
Id. at 146–47.
325.
Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Me. 1984) and Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
326.
See id.
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D. State Laws That Regulate Activities Beyond State Borders
The dormant Commerce Clause also prohibits state laws that attempt
to regulate beyond a state’s borders, which courts refer to as either direct
regulation of interstate commerce or extraterritorial regulation, 327 although
courts have recently expressed skepticism about the continued vitality of
this doctrine. 328 If a court determines that a law regulates extraterritorially,
the law is struck down without further inquiry. 329 The guiding principles
for this analysis “reflect the Constitution’s special concern both with the
maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed
limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual
States within their respective spheres.” 330
The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for determining
when a state law regulates extraterritorially. 331 “First, the ‘Commerce
Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.’” 332 Second, a state law that has the
practical effect of controlling commerce that occurs completely outside a
state’s boundaries is invalid, regardless of whether the legislature intended
the law to have an extraterritorial reach. 333 Third, the court must consider
whether the state law interferes with the legitimate regulations of other
states and what the effect would be if other states adopted similar laws. 334 A
party usually “must either present evidence that conflicting, legitimate
legislation is already in place or that the threat of such legislation is both
actual and imminent.” 335
As a general matter, “the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime
into the jurisdiction of another State. And, specifically, the Commerce
Clause dictates that no State may force an out-of-state merchant to seek
327.
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003); Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935).
328.
E.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 810–11 (6th. Cir. 2013) (Sutton,
J., concurring) (“I write separately to express skepticism about the extraterritoriality doctrine, the fulcrum of today’s decision and a branch of the dormant Commerce Clause that
the Supreme Court last referred to nine years ago as the doctrine applied in Baldwin and
Healy, decisions from 1935 and 1989.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
329.
Id. at 816.
330.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 335–36 (footnote omitted).
331.
See id. at 336–37.
332.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43
(1983) (plurality opinion)).
333.
Id.
334.
Id.
335.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 469–70 (9th Cir. 2001).
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regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in
another.” 336 An important point to keep in mind is that states frequently
exert regulatory effects outside their borders: the question is not if there is
an extraterritorial effect, but rather if an extraterritorial effect of the law
goes too far. 337 If the extraterritorial effects are incidental, their burdens on
interstate commerce are assessed under the more lenient Pike balancing
test, 338 which is discussed in Part II.E infra.
An early case that emphasizes one of the primary concerns of the Supreme Court is Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. In Baldwin, the Court struck
down a New York law that required all milk sold in the state to have been
purchased from the producer at or above a minimum price set by the
state. 339 When applied to milk produced in Vermont, it eliminated the
ability o� Vermont milk producers to use their lower production costs to sell
their milk more cheaply than New York milk producers. 340 The Court
struck down the law: New York could not protect its producers through the
use of a law that had the practical effect of controlling commerce that occurred completely outside the state’s boundaries. 341
Healy v. Beer Institute is representative of the Supreme Court’s limited
recent jurisprudence in this area. In Healy, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that required out-of-state beer importers to charge prices in
Connecticut that were at or below the prices they charged in any of Connecticut’s bordering states. 342 In determining the effective price being
charged in other states, Connecticut subtracted from the reported price the
value of any promotions, discounts, or rebates. 343 At the time, Massachusetts had a law that required beer importers to post a price that would
remain in effect for a month, and New York had a law that required promotional offers to remain available for 180 days. 344 Thus, beer importers had to
consider Connecticut’s law when deciding what price to charge in Massa336.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336–37 (citation omitted).
337.
IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 26–30 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Whatever the present scope of the extraterritoriality doctrine, it clearly does not require per se invalidation of
all extraterritorial applications contained within state statutes regulating commerce.”),
vacated sub nom. IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S.Ct. 3091 (2011). The court noted that
“[s]ome circuits have simply framed the [extraterritoriality] doctrine in terms of concerns
with preventing economic protectionism or inconsistent regulatory regimes, or have suggested that the Court’s cases do not dictate ‘the notion that direct and facial regulation of
extraterritorial transactions is absolutely banned.’” Id. at 29 n.28 (citations omitted) (quoting
Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 336 F.3d 545, 547–50 (7th Cir. 2003)).
338.
S.D. Myers, 253 F.3d at 471–72.
339.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519 (1935).
340.
Id. at 521–22.
341.
Id. at 522.
342.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1989).
343.
Id. at 327.
344.
Id. at 327–28.
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chusetts and what promotions to offer in New York, as those actions would
set a ceiling on what they could charge in Connecticut for the aforementioned durations. 345 The same was true of volume discounts, as
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island allowed them but Connecticut
did not, meaning that Connecticut prices would be set at the lowest amount
charged in other states, even i� high volumes were required to obtain those
prices in the other states. 346
The Court concluded that the law had an extraterritorial effect because
it required importers to forego competitive advantages and markets in other
states and effectively set prices in other states. 347 “States may not deprive
businesses and consumers in other States of ‘whatever competitive advantages they may possess’ based on the conditions of the local market.” 348
Additionally, there could have been significant problems on a national scale
if other states had implemented similar laws, amounting to regulation o�
beer prices in a way that only the federal government is authorized to do. 349

E. State Laws That Impose Nondiscriminatory Burdens on Interstate
Commerce
If a state law avoids being characterized as discriminatory, it will be assessed under the Pike balancing test. 350 The test is quite lenient: “Where the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.” 351 The burden tolerated depends on
the importance of the state interest and on whether that interest could be
promoted with less impact on interstate commerce. 352 This test requires a
court to make three fairly subjective inquiries: (1) whether the state’s interest is legitimate; (2) whether the burden on interstate commerce is clearly
excessive compared to the state interest; and (3) whether there are any less
burdensome alternatives. 353 “State laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny,” 354 although its result is difficult to predict and very fact specific. 355
345.
Id.
346.
Id. at 338–39.
347.
Id. at 339.
348.
Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 580 (1986)).
349.
Id. at 339–40.
350.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
351.
Id. at 142.
352.
Id.
353.
Id.
354.
Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008).
355.
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 249, at 55.
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Given the subjective nature of the inquiry and the lack of analogous cases,
an extensive review of the case law is unnecessary.
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., a Minnesota law “banning the
retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but
permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such
as paperboard milk cartons” was upheld by the Court. 356 The purpose of the
law was to reduce waste problems, conserve energy, and stop depletion of
natural resources, although opponents in the legislature presented a great
deal of evidence tending to show that the law would merely increase the
price of milk without yielding any of the purported benefits. 357 After chastising the state courts for invalidating the law on equal protection grounds
because the means chosen were not rationally related to the ends sought,
the Supreme Court noted that “it is not the function of the courts to substitute their evaluation o� legislative facts for that of the legislature.” 358 This
matters for the dormant Commerce Clause analysis because the Court then
proceeded to weigh what the state was trying to achieve rather than what the
state was likely to achieve against the burdens on interstate commerce. 359
After deciding that environmental protection and resource conservation
are legitimate state interests, the court upheld the law because it still allowed milk to move freely across state lines and there was insufficient
evidence that in-state businesses would be benefitted any more than out-ofstate ones as nonplastic alternatives began to be used. 360 Even granting a
differential burden that benefitted in-state pulp manufacturers, the state’s
alternatives were “either more burdensome on commerce” (requiring returnable containers) “or less likely to be effective (as, for example,
providing incentives for recycling).” 361

F. Limiting Doctrines on the Dormant Commerce Clause
There are three primary limitations on the dormant Commerce Clause:
the compensatory tax doctrine, the market participant exception, and the
public entity exception. Only the last is applicable to California’s regulations.
The compensatory tax doctrine allows states to assess taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce when the taxes are compensatory in
nature (i.e., when the tax is necessary to equalize the tax burden on inter-

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458 (1981).
Id. at 458–60.
Id. at 469–70.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 471–73.
Id. at 473–74.
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state and intrastate commerce). 362 The doctrine simply recognizes that
states should be able to apply equivalent burdens on intrastate and interstate commerce. 363 “ ‘It was not the purpose of the [C]ommerce [C]lause to
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state
tax burden[s].’ ” 364 The compensatory tax doctrine is not helpful for California because the same event, delivery of electricity to the grid, is being
taxed for both in-state and out-of-state sellers of electricity. That is, out-ofstate sellers are subject to the same tax as in-state sellers, rather than a
“compensatory” tax. Even if the taxes on in- and out-of-state parties are
viewed separately, the traditional discrimination analysis applies to compensatory taxes, such that this doctrine does not help California.
The market participant exception allows state and local governments to
discriminate against interstate commerce when they act as market participants by purchasing or selling, rather than acting as market regulators. 365 If
this exception is established, then the law is evaluated under the Pike balancing test. 366 Unless California, or another state attempting to regulate
imported electricity, is willing to go into the electricity business, 367 this
exception is o� little use. California would be regulating the sale of electricity rather than actually purchasing or selling it. While the state is selling a
permit to pollute, allowing this exception to apply to cap-and-trade programs would allow it to apply to a wide variety of regulatory regimes and
would largely swallow the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
The public entity exception allows state and local governments to pass
laws that discriminate against or burden interstate commerce but benefit
only themselves. 368 Governments are responsible for protecting the health
and welfare of their people, and the dormant Commerce Clause does not
limit the ability of governments to meet the needs of their people themselves. 369 Laws must treat all private parties the same to qualify for this
exception, though. 370 If the exception is established, the law at issue is
362.
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331–33 (1996).
363.
Id. at 332–33.
364.
Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102 (1994) (alteration in
original) (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau o� Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
365.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809–10 (1977) (“Nothing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others.”).
366.
Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008).
367.
Some commentators have advised just that to avoid constitutional attacks. See
Brian H. Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas ‘Leakage’: How California Can Evade the Impending
Constitutional Attacks, ELECTRICITY J., June 2006, at 43, 47–48.
368.
See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 342–43 (2007).
369.
See id.
370.
See id. at 345.
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assessed under the Pike balancing test. 371 Because California is regulating
both independently and publicly owned generators, this exception may help
California.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Now that we have discussed California’s stake in abating climate
change, its cap-and-trade program, and the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, we reach the task at hand. This Part analyzes the provisions and
aspects of California’s cap-and-trade program that make the program vulnerable to challenge and invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In addition to analyzing the program as designed, I suggest refinements
that could improve the chances of surviving a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.

A. If California’s Program Discriminates Against Interstate Commerce,
Can It Survive Strict Scrutiny?
This section analyzes the provisions of California’s cap-and-trade program that might be considered discriminatory and assesses potentially
discriminatory provisions under strict scrutiny. There are quite a few potential vulnerabilities in the cap-and-trade program. While the analysis that
follows applies to the California cap-and-trade program, it is also intended
to provide guidance to regulators in other states implementing cap-andtrade programs.

1. The Legislative and Regulatory Purpose Behind the Program
Courts often recite the rule that a discriminatory purpose is sufficient
to invoke strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. While no
case has apparently invalidated a state law on this basis, 372 state regulators
must be careful to avoid the appearance o� favoring intrastate commerce
over interstate commerce. If it appears that a state is attempting to gain a
competitive edge for its businesses through regulation, courts are likely to
scrutinize the regulation more closely and are more likely to invalidate it.
California does not appear to have a discriminatory purpose, although
there are parts of the legislative and regulatory history that could be construed as evincing a desire to gain an undue competitive advantage. First,
AB 32 requires that CARB develop the regulations to “maximize the total
benefits to California” and prevent leakage of California businesses and
371.
372.

Id. at 346.
See cases cited supra note 277.
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market share to other jurisdictions to the greatest extent possible. 373 Second, language in the cap-and-trade program regulatory history indicates
that CARB is adopting policies in part to keep industries from leaving
California. 374 These statements are protectionist in one sense: California
wants to keep industries in California. The point, however, is not to protect
California industries from normal competition. Rather, the point is to apply
the cap-and-trade program as fairly as possible to in- and out-of-state businesses. No discrimination against interstate commerce is necessary to stop
leakage: mere equal treatment is sufficient. 375 I� leakage occurs, it is because
out-of-state businesses are taking advantage of reduced compliance obligations. Additionally, preventing leakage is vital to achieving real reductions
of GHG emissions. Leakage artificially meets the cap and reduces California’s ability to meet targeted emissions reductions. Finally, while California
seeks to maximize the benefits it receives, this does not indicate that California is seeking to obtain benefits through discrimination against interstate
commerce. There are many non-discriminatory benefits that California can
obtain, such as improved air quality, better energy efficiency, and increased
tax revenue. Thus, the legislative and regulatory history does not indicate
that California has a protectionist purpose behind the creation or implementation of the cap-and-trade program.
It is also helpful to keep the bigger picture in mind. California’s capand-trade program is just one of many steps California is taking to reduce
GHG emissions. California has implemented one of the highest RPSs in
the country, 376 an emission standard for new power plants, 377 and a low
carbon fuel standard, 378 as well as other measures to reduce GHG emissions. 379 While these programs yield many benefits, they are costly to
California and its citizens. California’s comprehensive approach to reducing
GHG emissions and continued resolve in the face of challenges and costs
weigh strongly against finding a discriminatory purpose.

373.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (West 2012).
374.
See, e.g., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at ES-6, II-57 to -58;
MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-53.
375.
See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
376.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(a) (West 2012) (requiring that 33 percent of
retail electricity come from renewable sources by 2020).
377.
See id. § 8341 (establishing a GHG emission performance standard for power
plants in long-term contracts with California purchasers).
378.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2012) (establishing a low carbon
fuel standard).
379.
See Brie� for Professors o� Environmental Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos.
12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL 2376704, at *11–18.
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2. The Direct Allocation of Allowances to In-State Industry
California is directly allocating allowances to almost all of the industries in the state (aside from the electricity sector), although there is
substantial variation in how many allowances each industry will be allocated. 380 This is essentially a subsidy that reduces compliance costs for
California businesses under the cap-and-trade program. While out-of-state
businesses are not receiving this subsidy, they are not subject to the capand-trade regulations. As such, this is a pure subsidy situation, and the
Court has made clear that states are free to subsidize their businesses without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. 381

3. The Use of a Default Emission Factor to Calculate Compliance
Obligations for Unspecified Imported Electricity
California has chosen to use a default emission factor to regulate electricity from unspecified out-of-state sources but has chosen to use actual
emissions to regulate electricity from in-state and specified out-of-state
sources. This is one of the most critical aspects of the program, and it will
unfortunately be one of the hardest for California to defend from dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny because out-of-state and in-state electricity are
being treated differently. There are two distinct issues arising from California’s use of a default emission factor to calculate compliance obligations
for importers but not for in-state generators: (1) whether an average (the
default emission factor) can be used at all without being uniformly applied
to all sources of electricity; and (2) whether the default emission factor
chosen by California is discriminatory, assuming that California can use a
default emission factor.

a. The Use of a Default Emission Factor Only for Out-of-State
Electricity
i. Permissibility of Using an Average to Regulate
We now turn to the first issue, which is whether an average can be used
at all without being uniformly applied to all sources of electricity. This can
be further unpacked into two separate issues: (1) whether using an average
to calculate the compliance obligations of importers is discriminatory regardless of whether an average is also used for in-state generators, and (2)
whether, if an average is a permissible method of regulation, using an aver380.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95890–95891 (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT
REASONS, supra note 62, at II-30.
381.
See sources cited supra note 305.
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age only for out-of-state generators is discriminatory. These are addressed
in turn.
The Supreme Court does not appear to have decided a case in which
the use of an average was absolutely necessary, as it is here because California needs to charge regulated entities different fees for different production
processes that create an identical product but is unable to calculate individualized fees for each regulated entity. The Court has, however, decided a
case involving an attempt to justify the unnecessary use of an average under
the compensatory tax doctrine. 382 While it was a compensatory tax doctrine
case, the discrimination analysis is the same as under the traditional test in
the sense that interstate commerce cannot be taxed more heavily than intrastate commerce. 383
In Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, Missouri imposed a use
tax of 1.5% on goods purchased outside but used within the state. 384 This
tax was intended to compensate for local sales taxes, which varied in
amount throughout the over 1000 localities of the state that had adopted
them. 385 Missouri argued that, when averaged, the burden on in-state goods
was much higher than the burden on out-of-state goods. 386 Indeed, the
Missouri Supreme Court had concluded, based upon the stipulations of the
parties, that while 53.5% o� localities had sales taxes below 1.5%, over 93%
of the dollar volume of sales occurred in localities with sales taxes that were
higher than 1.5%. 387 This means that the weighted “average” of the local
sales taxes actually imposed was higher than the 1.5% use tax. 388 The Court
characterized the argument based on these facts unfavorably:
Respondents’ theory assumes that discrimination in some parts of a
state tax system may be permissible under the Commerce Clause as
long as it is of a sufficiently limited magnitude to be offset by preferential treatment for interstate trade in other portions of the tax
scheme. There is no question that, within a locality where the use
tax exceeds the sales tax, the tax structure discriminates against interstate trade. Respondents merely argue that the local jurisdiction
provides too narrow a framework for proper constitutional analysis. 389
382.
See Associated Indus. o� Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 643 (1994).
383.
See id. at 647–48 (applying the traditional test to determine if the alleged compensatory tax was discriminatory because it taxed out-of-state goods more heavily).
384.
Id. at 644.
385.
See id. at 644, 648–49.
386.
Id. at 649.
387.
Id. at 645.
388.
See id.
389.
Id. at 649.
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The Court rejected the use of an average and held that the tax was discriminatory because out-of-state goods were taxed more heavily than instate goods in some localities. 390 In doing so, it further disparaged the use
of an average and overruled a prior case employing the use of an average in
a very similar situation: “the General American approach to averaging burdens on interstate and intrastate commerce, which Chief Justice Robertson
[of the Supreme Court o� Missouri] aptly characterized as a rule of ‘ “close
enough for government work,” ’ never took root in our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.” 391 The Court went on to state that:
We have never suggested, however, that patent discrimination in
part of the operation of a tax scheme, not directly justified under
any theory such as the compensatory tax doctrine, can be rendered
inconsequential for Commerce Clause purposes by advantages given to interstate commerce in other facets of a tax plan or in other
regions of a State. On the contrary, as a general matter we have rejected reliance on any calculus that requires a quantification of
discrimination as a preliminary step to determining whether the discrimination is valid. Under our cases, unless one of several narrow bases
of justification is shown, actual discrimination, wherever it is
found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the discrimination have no bearing on the determinative question whether
discrimination has occurred. 392
The italicized text, at first blush, seems to indicate an unwillingness to
weigh the overall effects of a regulatory tax scheme instead of simply picking out a part that is, when taken alone, apparently discriminatory. The
hypertechnical approach suggested by the Court is untethered to any rational ends—if the burden on interstate commerce is lower than the burden
on intrastate commerce, there is no discrimination, even if there might
appear to be discrimination on the face of the statute. Read in context,
though, the Court seems to merely be stating the usual rule that no quantification will be used when the relative burdens on interstate and intrastate
commerce can be directly ascertained from the law. That is, there is no de
minimis exception for discrimination. While the Court incorrectly applied
that rule in this case because there was no actual discrimination overall, it
does not follow that no quantification will be used when a unique situation
arises in which there is no rational way to determine whether a law is dis-

390.
Id. at 648–49.
391.
See id. at 652 (citation omitted) (quoting Associated Indus. o� Mo. v. Dir. o�
Revenue, 857 S.W.2d 182, 195 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (Robertson, C.J., dissenting)).
392.
Id. at 649–50 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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criminatory without initially quantifying the relative burdens. The fact that
judges have to do a little math should not automatically make a law invalid.
While this case is likely to be relied upon by challengers, it is distinguishable. First, an average appears to be absolutely necessary to regulate
imported electricity from unspecified sources, whereas an average was not
necessary in Lohman. Given this reality, which does not appear to have been
present in any other case decided by the Court, there should be more flexibility in the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine than the formalistic rule
applied when averages are unnecessary. The purpose of the doctrine should
be the guiding principle, which is preventing actual discrimination against
out-of-state parties, 393 not innovative state regulation.
Second, the Court relied heavily on the fact that there were discrete localities in which in-state goods were taxed at a lower rate than out-of-state
goods, and the Court only invalidated the tax as to those localities. 394 That
is a straightforward application of the traditional doctrine, without the need
to make any judgments about the use of an average when necessary. Benefits to and burdens on out-of-state parties spread over different
geographically distinct markets is much less connected than benefit and
burden spread within the same market, as is the case with California’s use of
a default emission factor to determine the compliance obligations of importers of unspecified electricity. When there are different geographically
distinct markets, the use of an average will give in-state businesses an advantage in some markets and out-of-state businesses an advantage in other
markets. Looking at each individual market, there is clear discrimination in
some of those markets, even if there is no real discrimination in the aggregate. On the other hand, when an average is applied to a single market, the
only effect is a change in which out-of-state businesses in that market are
more competitive, rather than a shift in market share from out-of-state
businesses to in-state businesses (at least if the average is accurate). While
courts are quick to state that a law favoring in-state businesses is not saved
because some in-state businesses are burdened or some out-of-state businesses are benefitted, there logically must still be an aggregate benefit to
in-state interests for the law to be discriminatory. Otherwise there is no
rational reason to apply the dormant Commerce Clause, as the state is not
benefitting itself at the expense of other states.
Third, Lohman is distinguishable on the basis that the different taxes at
issue in that case were not part of a single regulatory program but instead
were numerous independent laws enacted by different levels of government. 395 Allowing multiple independent and unconnected laws, especially
393.
394.
395.

See City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978).
Lohman, 511 U.S. at 648–49.
See id. at 643–44.
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ones enacted by different levels of government, to be aggregated in order to
determine whether there is general discrimination across all of the laws
would likely prove unworkable in practice or dilute the dormant Commerce
Clause protections too much. States would attempt to justify discrimination
by pointing to other, potentially many, different regulations that have some
benefit to out-of-state parties and then ask the courts to compare all of the
different benefits and burdens. That would create very difficult linedrawing problems concerning how connected the benefit and burden need
to be. This problem is avoided by requiring that the same regulatory
program create the burden and benefit for the two to be weighed, as is the
case here.
The Court has not yet decided the narrower question that we must address here: How should an average regulatory fee that benefits some and
burdens other out-of-state parties relative to their in-state peers in the same
market be treated? That is, it is clear that out-of-state parties cannot be
burdened in some geographic areas and benefitted in others, but can one
subclass of out-of-state parties, such as importers who purchase mostly coal
or natural gas generation, be benefitted to the same degree that another
subclass, such as importers purchasing mostly renewable generation, is
burdened in the same market and by the same regulatory provision? On one
hand, cases like Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality
show no tolerance for any higher charge on interstate commerce, however
inconsequential. 396 In these cases, though, no out-of-state party was placed
in a better position than its in-state peers as a result o� how a tax or fee was
calculated or a regulation was structured. The fee or regulation was categorically more onerous for out-of-state parties.
On the other hand, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland makes clear
that states can burden one class of out-of-state competitors as long as there
are others that can compete on equal terms with in-state business. 397 The
Maryland law seemed facially discriminatory because, as there were no
producers or refiners of petroleum in the state, it could only be applied to
out-of-state businesses. 398 The law was saved because other out-of-state
businesses were competing with the in-state businesses, and the prohibition
probably benefitted those out-of-state businesses as much as it benefitted
the in-state ones. 399 There was no evidence that the law caused a shift of
market share to in-state entities. 400 If we think of marketers purchasing
different generation types as representing the different types o� businesses
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
Exxon Corp. v. Governor o� Md., 437 U.S. 117, 123–26 (1978).
Id. at 123.
See id. at 126.
Id.
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that wanted to operate retail gas stations in Exxon, the analogy indicates
that certain marketers can be discriminated against as long as there is no
overall discrimination against out-of-state parties that benefits in-state
parties.
Perhaps the rule to be distilled from these cases is that any subclass of
out-of-state businesses can be burdened as long as another subclass of outof-state businesses is benefitted and there is no shift of market share to instate businesses as a result of the law. Under this rule, such a law shifting
economic advantage among subclasses of competitors is not deemed discriminatory. Under this rule, California can argue that because importing
marketers are both benefitted and burdened in the same market, its
regulation is not discriminatory. Under the 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh default
emission factor contemplated by CARB, importing marketers who buy
unspecified electricity primarily from coal generation will face less than
half the compliance costs that they would if they were located in California,
but importing marketers who buy electricity primarily from renewable
generation, including nuclear, will face substantial compliance costs that
they would not be liable for if they were located in California. It is important to note that the default emission factor is low, as it is substantially
lower than the average emission rate of a gas-fired plant, which is approximately 0.515 MTCO2e/MWh. 401
Instead of a comparison of the effects of the regulation on individual
in-state and out-of-state marketers, California can argue that there must be
a comparison between the regulation’s effects on the intrastate and interstate electricity markets as a whole. The Commerce “Clause protects the
interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.” 402 While this is a good argument and holds true to
the purpose behind the dormant Commerce Clause, a court would likely be
hesitant to rely on it. The use of an average, given its imprecision, most
likely must survive strict scrutiny because thorough analysis is likely necessary to determine whether an average is discriminatory or not.
The second sub-issue is whether California must apply a default emission factor to in-state electricity if it applies one to out-of-state electricity.
It is difficult to determine whether this would be required. It is likely that
strict scrutiny will be used to assess California’s decision to use actual emissions to determine the compliance obligations of in-state businesses while
applying a default emission factor to determine the compliance obligations
of out-of-state businesses.
Shortly before publication of this Article, the Ninth Circuit decided
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, which involves a dormant
401.
402.

See Clean Energy, supra note 214.
Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 127–28.
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Commerce Clause challenge to California’s low carbon fuel standard
(LCFS). 403 The LCFS uses a lifecycle analysis, which involves consideration of all aspects of production, refining, and transportation of a fuel, to
determine and assign a GHG intensity to transportation fuels, including
ethanol. 404 Importantly, the LCFS initially assigns an emission intensity
using default lifecycle pathways. 405 Default lifecycle pathways are common
lifecycles for each fuel that use average emission values for each part of the
lifecycle to obtain an overall average emission intensity for a fuel produced
and delivered generally in line with the applicable default lifecycle pathway. 406 Regulated parties are given the ability to request a modification to
one or more of the average values in a default pathway or to submit an
individualized pathway under certain circumstances. 407
While the district court struck down the LCFS on the basis that it was
facially discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit panel, by a two-to-one vote, reversed the district court. 408 By holding that the use of default emission
pathways is not facially discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit has provided
support for the permissibility of using average values to regulate in certain
circumstances, at least when “based on scientific data” rather than an “ungrounded presumption that unfairly prejudices out-of-state” parties. 409
However, given the district court’s initial ruling and the dissent on appeal,
it is unclear whether this decision will be endorsed by the Supreme Court,
other circuits, or even other Ninth Circuit panels, or extended to more
complicated situations like California’s cap-and-trade program. It is important to note that California is using default lifecycle pathways, and
therefore average values, to regulate both in- and out-of-state entities,
meaning the court did not address whether California must use average
values for both in- and out-of-state entities if it uses average values for
either in-state or out-of-state entities.
The analysis presented in this Article demonstrates that the use an average in California’s cap-and-trade program is even more justifiable than
the use of average values in the LCFS. While the use of average values in
the LCFS is strongly supported by the analysis in this Article above, California could use solely individualized pathways to assign emission values in
the LCFS—a point relied on by the dissent. 410 As discussed in this Article,
California cannot assign individualized GHG emission values in the cap403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1080–82.
Id. at 1081–82.
Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id. at 1089, 1093–96.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1108–11.
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and-trade program because it is not possible to trace a significant portion of
out-of-state electricity back to individual generators. 411

ii. Strict Scrutiny of the Decision to Use an Average
As discussed above, California’s decisions to use a default emission factor and to apply the default emission factor only to imported electricity will
likely be reviewed under strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the State
must show that its regulation “advances a legitimate local purpose that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 412 California is regulating GHG emissions to mitigate climate
change, which is clearly a legitimate local purpose and has been recognized
as such by the Supreme Court. 413 California has a strong interest in abating
climate change because it will face severe impacts from climate change in
both the short and long term. Climate change is predicted to have wideranging consequences: a decrease in annual precipitation and snowpack that
will result in severe water shortages, an increase in the number and size of
summer wildfires, an increase in sea levels that threatens hundreds of thousands of people and property worth tens o� billions of dollars, an increase
in tidal erosion that may result in a loss o� forty-one square miles of California’s coast, a decrease in air quality that will eliminate all projected
improvements through 2050, a decrease in public health generally, an increase in energy use, and a decrease in environmental quality and
services. 414 In addition to the weighty harms that cannot be easily monetized, these effects are estimated to cost California billions of dollars
annually over the course of the next century. California has a strong local
interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, preventing
reduction of its sovereign territory, reducing burdens on the public fisc, and
preserving its environment.
There is, however, uncertainty inherent in any forward-looking predictions, especially predictions involving a phenomenon as complex as climate
change. No one can be certain that reducing GHG emissions will avert the
worst impacts of climate change or that the predicted impacts will even
occur, 415 although we already appear to be experiencing substantial
411.
See supra Part I.D.3.
412.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
413.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (states have a legitimate
interest in reducing GHG emissions).
414.
See supra Part I.A.
415.
Indeed, some commentators have argued that a state’s interest in abating climate
change is so difficult to quantify that it should be considered a political question. See generally Mary Bede Russell, Note, What’s It to You?: The Difficulty of Valuing the Benefits of ClimateChange Mitigation and the Need for a Public-Goods Test Under Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis, 94 IOWA L. REV. 727 (2009). I have presented a quantification of California’s interest in
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warming. 416 Unfortunately, we do not live in a world of perfect information.
The studies that have been undertaken to predict the impacts of climate
change represent the best that science can currently do. Even if there is
uncertainty in the predicted effects of climate change, those predictions are
staggering. Trying to limit the chances of such impacts alone should be
given much weight. Few things are certain. Legislatures and governments
must rely on the best information available to determine their policies and
protect their people.
In an attempt to reduce the predicted impacts of climate change, California has created a cap-and-trade program that reduces the GHG
emissions associated with its in-state activities and electricity use. While
California is but one actor in a global problem, its economy is the sixth
largest in the world 417 and its GHG emissions are the twelfth highest in the
world. 418 Significant reductions in California’s GHG emissions matter, even
if those reductions are not enough to stop global climate change alone. It is
important to note that stopping global climate change is all but impossible:
it is already happening. Rather, what states and countries are achieving is
incremental reduction in the intensity and consequences of climate change.
Reduction of GHG emissions translates into milder climate change. These
reductions take on added importance when one considers that climate
change may be non-linear—meaning that added emissions may have an
exponential effect on the climate once a tipping point is reached.
Further, even if one were to accept the argument that California will
not be able to mitigate climate change alone, California is neither banking
on protecting itself through unilateral actions nor acting alone. California is
being joined by Quebec, and three other Canadian provinces are considering joining the program. 419 Nine states are already operating a cap-andtrade program limited to the electricity sector, and they may eventually join
California and Quebec. 420 In addition, over thirty other countries will have
operating cap-and-trade programs by 2013 and at least eight more are considering cap-and-trade programs. 421 And these are just cap-and-trade
abating climate change sufficient to satisfy the Pike balancing test, so I do not address this
theory further.
416.
See, e.g., Black, supra note 3; Ogrocki, supra note 3.
417.
Jason Hanna, Report: California Slips to World’s 9th Largest Economy, CNN (Jan. 13,
2012, 8:20 PM), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/13/report-california-slips-to-worlds-9thlargest-economy/.
418.
International Herald Tribune, California Reaches Deal to Limit Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/31/news/31ihtweb.0831warming.2648288.html.
419.
Luesebrink, supra note 16.
420.
See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last visited
Feb. 22, 2013).
421.
Luesebrink, supra note 16.
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programs. Many other states and countries are taking action to reduce their
GHG emissions in other ways. 422 Rather than working alone, California is
joining a global effort to combat climate change and is taking the lead to
show the other states that a cap-and-trade program is feasible. What California can accomplish must be assessed in light of the cooperative effort.
While it is uncertain how many countries and states will follow California’s
lead, it is certain that the more severe impacts of global climate change will
not be averted or mitigated if no action is taken.
To achieve actual reductions of its GHG emissions, California must
prevent leakage and resource shuffling. As discussed supra, 423 resource
shuffling and leakage are threats to achieving actual reductions because they
create the appearance of reductions without any reductions having taken
place. Additionally, leakage and resource shuffling remove emissions from
California’s regulatory regime, such that California would have a harder
time reducing its GHG emissions even if it adjusted for these problems.
However, there is a reasonable argument that California has no interest
in preventing resource shuffling because the state can only regulate the
emissions associated with its electricity consumption, such that it should be
content with regulating the emissions from the new sources of the electricity that it consumes after leakage and resource shuffling have occurred. This
argument has some intuitive appeal, but it should be rejected. Without the
cap-and-trade program there would be a certain generation mix supplying
electricity to California. California is implementing the cap-and-trade
program to account for the GHG emissions associated with its current
consumption of electricity from these sources. The program seeks to reduce
the emissions intensity o� both the in-state generation mix and the out-ofstate generation mix that supplies electricity to California. The in-state
generation mix will likely become cleaner as a result of the program. If
resource shuffling occurs, the out-of-state generation mix that supplies
electricity to California will not actually become cleaner overall, allowing
importers to avoid legitimate regulation attached to their sale of electricity
into California. Stated differently, changes made by businesses engaged in
interstate commerce made for the sole purpose of avoiding state regulation
should not allow them to circumvent the regulatory program when they are
still availing themselves of the same benefits in the state. While the
dormant Commerce Clause limits California’s ability to discriminate
against interstate commerce, it does not require that interstate commerce

422.
What Others Are Doing, CLEANENERGYFUTURE.GOV, http://www.cleanenergyfut
ure.gov.au/why-we-need-to-act/what-others-are-doing/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
423.
See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
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profit at California’s expense by avoiding legitimate regulations. 424
“[I]nterstate commerce may be made to pay its way.” 425
California must also show that the regulations advance its interests.
The use of a default emission factor actually undermines California’s goal of
achieving reductions of GHG emissions to some degree because imported
electricity from renewable energy generators will be subject to the same
compliance obligations as all other generation types when the renewable
generators do not qualify as specified sources. With no reduced compliance
obligations for renewable energy generators, no direct incentive will be
created to shift the generation mix to cleaner generation types. However,
California appears to have only two options: regulate unspecified imported
electricity with a default emission factor, or not regulate unspecified imported electricity at all. Using the default emission factor arguably advances
the local purposes more than not using the default emission factor because
if the default emission factor is not used, then high-emitting generators
would structure their electricity sales to make the electricity unspecified. By
applying a default emission factor, California is accounting for some of the
emissions associated with the electricity, even though it is likely that these
generators will still structure their transactions to take advantage of the
lower default emission factor. Given the fact that generators have the ability
to structure their transactions to change between the specified- and unspecified-source categories, it is likely that low-emission generators will arrange
their sales to make themselves specified sources, such that they will not
have any compliance obligations. The ability of importers to adjust the
applicable emissions rate is, however, limited to some degree by the prohibition on resource shuffling. Using a default emission factor also helps
prevent leakage and resource shuffling from draining the emissions reductions achieved by the rest of the cap-and-trade program and severely
undermining its integrity.
The final question is whether California has any less discriminatory alternatives. It does not appear that California can achieve both, or either, of
its purposes without using a default emission factor to calculate the compliance obligations of at least some importers of unspecified electricity. After
considering the issue, both California and New Jersey regulators concluded
that a default emission factor has to be assigned to some imported electricity because it cannot be traced to a particular generator. 426 Commentators
are in accord, and no commentator has proffered a way to trace all electricity sales back to particular generators. 427 In the absence of a feasible
424.
425.
426.
427.

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 204–207.
See supra notes 230–234 and accompanying text.
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alternative method of accounting for the emissions of imported electricity,
the use of a default emission factor should stand. As the Court held in
Maine v. Taylor:
[T]he “abstract possibility” of developing [alternative] procedures,
particularly when there is no assurance as to their effectiveness,
does not make those procedures an “[a]vailabl[e] . . . nondiscriminatory alternativ[e]” . . . . A State must make reasonable efforts to
avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its borders, but
it is not required to develop new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost. 428
Given the uniform position taken by regulators and commentators, the
burden is on challengers to present a workable alternative. The stakes are
high: if a court refuses to allow the use of an average, it will substantially
impair the ability of states or regional consortiums to implement comprehensive cap-and-trade programs and achieve real reductions of GHG
emissions.
However, there appear to be a few potentially less discriminatory alternatives available for at least some of the unspecified electricity. First,
California may need to relax the direct delivery requirement for electricity
to be considered specified. While the direct delivery requirement is an
important method of preventing resource shuffling, keeping the strong
version of this requirement jeopardizes California’s ability to use a default
emission factor. California appears to have the ability to track some electricity that will currently be considered unspecified back to specific generators,
as the RPS adjustment is being used to reduce the compliance obligations
of importers of unspecified electricity from renewable generators. 429 If
California lacked the ability to trace this electricity back to a generator,
then it would not be able to give the importers this downward adjustment.
Rather, this appears to be electricity that can be traced back to a source but
is not directly delivered, probably because the renewable generation source
is intermittent and the electricity must be firmed and shaped before delivery. While it is not ideal from a regulatory standpoint, California should
demonstrate its good faith to the courts by allowing all generators to which
electricity can be traced to qualify as specified sources absent some indication of misconduct on the part of the generator or importer.
Second, there is a potentially less discriminatory method of regulation
that may warrant further investigation—what I call the “marketer average.”
428.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986) (alterations in quote in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Me. 1984) and
Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
429.
See supra text accompanying notes 192–196.
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The primary problem with regulating GHG emissions from electricity
generation is that the electricity oftentimes cannot be traced back to any
particular generator because it has been purchased and sold many times and
mixed with other electricity. 430 Once the electricity is generated and placed
on the grid, it is indistinguishable from the other electricity on the grid. It
is possible, however, to trace financial transactions from particular generators to particular purchasers (at least in most cases).
Many marketers purchase their power from many individual generators. The main problem with determining the GHG emissions associated
with electricity imported into California by marketers is that the electricity
purchased from each generator is not segregated, making it generally impossible to correctly attribute any particular electricity to any particular
generator when there are many purchases. 431 However, this may not be
necessary. California could require marketers selling electricity into California to use a database to keep records of which generators they are
purchasing from in the geographic areas from which electricity could be
supplied to California. These purchases could be kept in chronological
order, and there could be a running tally of the energy inventory that each
marketer has. This inventory would not include electricity from generators
that is contractually committed to specific purchasers (i.e., when the electricity from a particular generator is designated to fulfill a specific
purchaser’s contract), as this electricity would not be available for sale into
California as unspecified electricity. 432 Each sale of electricity to any purchaser would deplete this inventory, starting with the oldest purchase.
The current inventory could be used to calculate the average GHG
emissions per MWh, and this figure could be used to determine the marketer’s compliance obligations when it imports electricity into California.
Ideally, California could develop computer programs to streamline the
collection and calculation of this information in real time. This would allow
the calculation of particularized compliance obligations for marketers in a
method similar to the way in which compliance obligations are calculated
for generators with multiple co-located facilities that have different emissions profiles (the emissions of all facilities are weighted and averaged to
yield average emissions per MWh). 433 This method of calculating compliance obligations would have a good chance o� both surviving scrutiny and
forcing a shift toward cleaner generation types. California would need to
compensate marketers for the costs of administering the program, though,
so that their compliance obligations are not more onerous than those of
430.
431.
432.
433.

INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 167–172, 193–203.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(99) (2012).

Fall 2013]

The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program

151

their in-state peers. While seemingly plausible in theory, it is not clear if
this approach is administratively feasible and therefore an available nondiscriminatory alternative.
Third, California could apply a default emission factor to electricity
generated in California. This would potentially allow domestic and imported electricity to be treated identically. However, requiring California to use
a default emission factor for its own electricity would severely undermine
the cap-and-trade program because it would make it very difficult to impose
accurate GHG costs on domestic electricity. As the method of assigning
GHG emissions becomes more accurate, the signal to shift to cleaner fuels
becomes stronger and more GHG reductions are achieved. Therefore,
courts should not require California to apply a default emission factor to
electricity generated in-state. If the courts do require California to apply a
default emission factor, it is unclear (1) to what electricity the default emission factor would need to be applied and (2) whether this could be a
California-only default emission factor or whether California would need to
use the same WECC default emission factor applied to imported electricity.
Currently, specified and unspecified electricity are defined by attributes that only exist for imported electricity. 434 More specifically, the
requirement that the electricity be directly delivered to the California grid
for the generator of the electricity to be considered a specified source cannot be applied to California generators because their electricity will always
be directly delivered to the grid. In order to be able to apply a default emission factor to both in-state and out-of-state electricity, California would
need to alter the specified electricity requirements to make them applicable
to both in-state and out-of-state electricity, such that they are treated identically. One potential way to do this is to shift the focus of the regulation
from delivery to the California grid to delivery to a California utility or end
user. Instead of defining specified sources as those that directly deliver to
the California grid, California could define specified sources as those that
directly deliver to California utilities or end users. CARB would need to
evaluate this option to determine if it is workable, but it may be a viable
way to make single definitions for specified and unspecified sources that
would apply equally to in-state and out-of-state electricity. While this is not
ideal from a regulatory standpoint because carbon pricing becomes less
exact than it could be in California, it may allow the program to continue to
operate effectively, if not optimally.
If California is required to use a default emission factor for electricity
generated in-state, California should be able to use a California-only default
emission factor for its electricity. California’s electricity sector is
434.

See supra Parts I.D.1, I.D.3.
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substantially cleaner than the surrounding states’ electricity sectors, making
the WECC default emission factor too high. 435 Other states would likely
object to this approach, however, and ask to be assigned their own default
emission factors. While this would be more ideal, it is not possible because
most or all unspecified electricity cannot be traced back to its source, such
that it would be impossible to apply state default emission factors even if
they were developed. Accordingly, using a California-only default emission
factor for California and a WECC default emission factor for other states is
the closest that California can come to treating in-state and out-of-state
electricity the same, if it is even feasible to do that. The recent Ninth Circuit decision upholding California’s LCFS supports this argument, as the
court upheld the application of different default average emission values to
fuels produced in California and fuels produced outside of California. 436
Fourth, California may be able to adapt the Western Renewable Energy
Generation Information System (WREGIS) to track electricity throughout
the WECC region. WREGIS is a voluntary, independent registry and
tracking system for RECs that registers renewable generators, tracks how
much power they produce, issues RECs to account for that generation, and
tracks transactions involving RECs to avoid double counting. 437 While
WREGIS does not actually track the sale or flow of the electricity that
corresponds to the RECs, a number of stakeholders have suggested that the
WREGIS platform could be modified to track electricity from generator to
end user. 438 California has indicated that it may be possible to modify
WREGIS in this manner (or use a different system), but it will undoubtedly take much time and investment to create a reliable tracking system. 439 At
this point, it is not clear that this tracking system can be developed, but
California should begin investing in its development immediately. If the
ability to track all electricity to its source could be developed, such that use
of a default emission factor became unnecessary, regulation of imported
electricity would become much simpler and more likely to survive a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge. This would also make it more likely
that other states would implement cap-and-trade programs, as it would be
significantly easier to develop an effective program. At this point, this
avenue is too uncertain a basis on which to invalidate California’s use of a
default emission factor. 440

435.
PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 1–3.
436.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1093-97 (9th Cir. 2013).
437.
About WREGIS, WECC.BIZ, http://www.wecc.biz/WREGIS/Pages/AboutWREG
IS.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
438.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 602, 612–13, 1542.
439.
Id.
440.
See supra text accompanying note 426.
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b. The Default Emission Factor Chosen
If an average (the default emission factor) can be used for unspecified
imported electricity, the issue then becomes more specific: is the average
chosen the least discriminatory (or most accurate) average that could be
used? Traditional strict scrutiny analysis is ill-suited to this determination
because it requires a comparison o� burdens but does not provide a method
for quantifying the relative burdens in complicated situations.
I propose the following framework for analysis to determine whether
less discriminatory alternative averages are available. This framework for
analysis adapts the traditional analysis used by the courts to the challenging
regulatory situation presented here while staying true to the purposes underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. Whether the average chosen is
discriminatory should turn on whether the average places an equivalent
burden on in-state and out-of-state parties and is the most accurate average
available. A judge applying the equivalent burden test would review the
method used to calculate the average for out-of-state parties (and in-state
parties, if applicable), the possible alternative averages or information that
could have been used instead, the regulatory burden on in-state parties, the
regulatory burden on out-of-state parties, and the equivalence of the two
burdens.
The alternatives analysis would focus on whether the regulating state
has used the most accurate and least discriminatory methodology for creating the average and whether it has used the most pertinent information in
filling in the values used in the methodology. The State has the burden to
show that it does not have more precise or less discriminatory alternatives
that could be utilized to calculate the average but still achieve the local
purpose being advanced by the law. When the plaintiff is challenging the
underlying facts used to formulate the average, the judge should limit the
challenge to the material facts and sources o� facts that the State is using in
order to avoid protracted litigation aimed at delaying implementation of
the state program. The question of alternatives is not which alternative best
achieves the local purpose, but which alternative substantially achieves the
local purpose using the least discriminatory means.
Simply because a state could discount the average to help ensure that it
is not in any way discriminatory should not suffice to make the chosen
average discriminatory or to establish that there is a less discriminatory
alternative, or the use of an average becomes pointless. Because, as proposed above, an average can only be used when there are no non-average
methods of achieving the local purpose, the court will have already determined that an average is a legitimate, if imprecise, method of regulation.
The judge should review the relative burdens on in-state and out-of-state
parties, in conjunction with the legislative or administrative history, to
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determine whether a discriminatory purpose was clearly intended or discrimination is the clear effect of the average. If such a purpose or effect is
evident, a court would be warranted in requiring discounting of the average
to reflect more accurately the burden on in-state parties.
Given that averages are difficult to create, especially when they involve
the informational complexities of, for example, the electricity markets, this
test should adequately protect out-of-state interests. 441 Rather than a “close
enough for government work” 442 rule, this rule simply acknowledges that
difficult regulatory situations will arise in which it would be irresponsible to
apply the simplifying assumptions behind the formalistic rule that are
usually justified. This rule keeps true to the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause, which is to prevent states from discriminating against
interstate commerce to further their own economic interests. 443 Regulations
should not be prohibited simply because they must be complex to be effective.
We now turn to an analysis of the default emission factor chosen, a difficult task. We must first assess the method used to create the default
emission factor to determine if it is discriminatory and determine whether
there are any less discriminatory alternative methods of calculating the
default emission factor. California has calculated the default emission factor
using the average emissions of marginal, unassigned facilities in the WECC
region. 444 A marginal facility is defined as one that operates at a capacity
factor lower than 60 percent, which means that it generates less than 60
percent of the electricity it could generate if it continuously produced its
maximum generation capacity. 445 “Unassigned facility” typically refers to a
facility that is not contractually committed to providing electricity to particular customers. The default emission factor is initially set at 0.428
MTCO2e/MWh, 446 but it will be updated for each compliance period to
reflect changes in the emissions profiles of the marginal facilities in the
WECC region. 447 The other members of the WCI (which included seven
states and four Canadian provinces when the default emission calculator
was developed) supported the use and contributed to the development of
441.
The absolute need to use an average to achieve a local purpose will probably be an
issue o� first impression, giving lower courts the ability to fashion new rules to address it. It
is unlikely, but possible, that there will be non-Supreme Court precedent that the lower
courts will need to consider. I have encountered no such precedent in the federal courts,
including the courts following Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994).
442.
Id. at 652 (internal quotation marks omitted).
443.
See infra Part II.A.
444.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 602–03.
445.
Id.
446.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95111(b) (2012).
447.
MRR INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 209, at 167.
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this method of calculating the default emission factor, which weighs in favor
of using this method. 448
This method of calculation has both advantages and drawbacks based
on space, time, and generator class, which are addressed in turn. First, the
default emission factor is being calculated for the entire WECC region,
which is quite large at 1.8 million square miles. 449 This has the advantage of
accounting for resource shuffling in the WECC region, as the single default
emission factor takes into account all of the marginal generators in the
region. 450 The major drawback of this approach is that it makes the default
emission factor less specific than it could be. If default emission factors
were instead calculated for smaller regions, the factors would more closely
match the emissions of the generators exporting from those regions.
California could instead use the marginal, unassigned generation mix of
the Northwest and Southwest regions to calculate and apply regional default emission factors to electricity imported into the state from those
regions. Regional default emission factors would better approximate the
emissions intensity of the imported electricity from each region, as there
are substantial differences in the mix of electricity exported by each region. 451 The Southwest exports electricity primarily from natural gas
facilities, while the Northwest exports electricity from a mix of natural gas
and hydropower facilities. Regional default emission factors have the advantage of making each importer’s compliance obligations closer to what
they would be if the importer were an in-state generator. While the WECC
default emission factor may be accurate in the aggregate, such that out-ofstate electricity is subject to the same regulatory burdens as in-state electricity, it shifts compliance costs among importers to a greater degree than
is necessary or desirable. Additionally, regional default emission factors are
likely to properly account for resource shuffling. It appears unlikely that
importers could economically wheel power through the WECC region to
take advantage of a lower default emission factor for one of the regions. 452
On balance, regional default emission factors appear superior and
should be used i� feasible, as they allow relatively accurate accounting of the
electricity imported from each region while accounting for resource shuffling. While the regions are still large, there is no way to tie imported

448.
See FINAL STATEMENT OF REASON, supra note 191, at 602–03.
449.
About WECC, WECC.BIZ, http://www.wecc.biz/about/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Apr. 5, 2013).
450.
See INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-20.
451.
See supra Table 1 for information on the generation mixes of the Northwest and
Southwest.
452.
ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 5.
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electricity to particular states (which would allow calculation of default
emission factors for each exporting state). 453
Second, a single default emission factor is in effect for an entire compliance period (two or three years). 454 This makes administration of the
program considerably easier and provides regulated parties with clear guidance. However, the emissions intensity of the marginal generators is not
static. It varies constantly and can change substantially over time. 455 There
are several possible methods of calculating the default emission factor that
could result in a more accurate number. California could calculate a new
default emission factor for (1) each year; (2) each subset of a year, such as
semiannually; or (3) every hour. Two or three years is a long period, and it
creates the risk that there will be substantial reductions in the emissions
intensity of the unspecified imported electricity that do not reduce the
compliance obligations of importers. Recalculation every year, or even a
shorter period such as six months, may be desirable, depending on recent
advancements in emission-reduction technology and on the types of new
facilities that are coming online.
While it would be ideal (from an accuracy standpoint) to calculate the
default emission factor using the smallest time increment possible, which is
one hour, this appears infeasible for both California and industry, as this
would require California to constantly recalculate the default emission
factor and would require industry to record all energy transactions separately for each one-hour period. 456 However, it appears that most stakeholders
requested that California only calculate a new default emission factor for
each compliance period in order to even out yearly variations and to provide them with the information necessary to plan their business affairs. 457
California should not be required to change parts of its program that were
adopted at the request of the parties who would be challenging the program. Regardless, while it would be time-consuming to recalculate the
default emission factor more often, California would likely not face any
serious problems if it were required to do so.
Third, California has chosen to use marginal, unassigned generators to
calculate the default emission factor. This appears to be the most accurate
453.
An analysis of the actual data that could be used to calculate the regional default
emission factors is beyond the scope of this Article, but it appears that relatively accurate
data is available.
454.
See MRR INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 209, at 167.
455.
See, e.g., Joshua S. Graff Zivin, Matthew Kotchen & Erin T. Mansur, Spatial and
Temporal Heterogeneity of Marginal Emissions: Implications for Electric Cars and Other ElectricityShifting Policies 1 (Nat’l Bureau o� Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18462, 2012), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18462.
456.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 603.
457.
See MRR INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 209, at 167.
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class to use in calculating the default emission factor because marginal
generators supply the vast majority of unspecified electricity. 458 Facilities
with high-capacity factors are running most of the time and are usually
supplying baseload power under long-term contracts, which makes them
eligible to be specified sources. Electricity from marginal generators is then
used to supplement the baseload electricity on an as-needed basis and generally without long-term contracts, which usually makes the electricity
unspecified. However, the requirement that specified electricity be directly
delivered may result in some non-marginal generators being considered
unspecified sources, especially renewable generators, in which case using
the marginal generators may over-estimate the emissions of unspecified
electricity.
Additionally, California stated that it excluded hydropower from the
marginal generator class 459 even though hydropower facilities supply some
marginal electricity because of their ability to quickly ramp up and down.
California regulators excluded hydropower facilities on the basis that they
are eligible to become specified sources, 460 and this appears to be justified,
as a large percentage of the hydropower imports come from Bonneville
Power Administration, which was assigned a very low specified emission
factor. 461 It is possible that the new direct delivery requirement will result
in a number o� hydropower facilities becoming unspecified sources, in
which case they should be included in the calculation of the default emission factor. Other than hydropower, the marginal generators are almost
always natural gas-fired facilities but may include some coal plants. 462
The remaining issue with this method is whether California is only including marginal generators in its calculation by requiring that the facilities
have a capacity factor lower than 60%. 463 I� baseload generators, which are
usually coal facilities that deliver specified electricity, are included, then the
default emission factor may be artificially increased. While some hydropower and nuclear facilities provide baseload power and natural gas is on
the rise, coal is the dominant provider o� baseload power. 464 Baseload

458.
ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 6.
459.
MRR INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 209, at 168.
460.
Id.
461.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95111(b)(3) (2012) (Bonneville Power Administration
emission factor is 20% of the default emission factor); FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS,
note 191, at 2063–64.
462.
Siler-Evans, Azevedo & Morgan, supra note 212, at 4744.
463.
Id.; FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 602–03.
464.
John Downey, Low Price of Natural Gas Prompts Duke Energy Power Shift,
CHARLOTTE BUSINESS JOURNAL (Feb. 24, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
charlotte/print-edition/2012/02/24/low-price-of-natural-gas-prompts-duke.html?page=all.
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generators usually have capacity factors over 70%. 465 Setting the capacity
factor at 60% appears reasonable, as it is far enough below the capacity
factors o� baseload facilities that they are probably not being included in
the class of generators used to calculate the default emission factor.
Turning to the actual default emission factor chosen, the question is
whether electricity generated in-state is subject to the same regulatory
burden as electricity generated out-of-state. In order for the burden to be
the same, the default emission factor must accurately reflect the average
GHG emissions of an average MWh of imported unspecified electricity.
Stated differently, the ideal default emission factor is the sum of all of the
emissions associated with the imported unspecified electricity divided by
the number o� MWhs imported. While we cannot directly calculate this
number in practice because of the complexity of the electricity markets, this
is the number we are attempting to calculate. If the default emission factor
is set higher, then out-of-state generators are being discriminated against. If
the default emission factor is set lower, then in-state generators are being
discriminated against.
The default emission factor chosen, 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh, appears
reasonable. Most coal and nuclear facilities are tied up in long-term contracts, preventing the electricity that they generate from being sold as
unspecified electricity, 466 which indicates that the default emission factor
should at most be around the emissions of an average gas-fired facility.
Instead o� being equivalent to the emissions of an average gas-fired facility,
0.515 MTCO2e/MWh, 467 the default emission factor is substantially lower.
However, looking at Alvarado and Griffin’s data from 2005, one would
expect the default emission factor to be a little lower. Based on the 2005
data, it appears that the average MWh of unspecified electricity would have
associated emissions of around 0.407 MTCO2e/MWh. 468 However, the data
used by Alvarado and Griffin is seven years out of date and the difference
is likely due to changes in imports and changes in how specified and unspecified electricity is defined. The difference between the two default
emission factors is also small, although the difference would add up quickly
for large generators.

465.
What Is a Capacity Factor?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=187&t=3 (last updated May 13, 2013).
466.
See supra Part I.D.2.
467.
Clean Energy, supra note 214.
468.
See supra notes 201–205, 228 and accompanying text. This approximate default
emission factor was calculated by multiplying the GWhs of each type of unspecified imported electricity by the applicable approximate average emissions intensity of that type of
electricity, summing all of the results, and then dividing that sum by the total GWhs of
unspecified imported electricity.
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The reasonableness o� both the method used and the default emission
factor calculated is also supported by the fact that a number of industry
stakeholders argued that California is underestimating the emissions of
imported electricity. 469 Some suggested that California calculate the default
emission factor from the highest-emitting 25 percent of the marginal generators to prevent imported electricity from receiving more favorable
treatment than electricity generated in-state. 470 Many argued that the default emission factor was too low and did not reflect the emissions intensity
of imported electricity. 471 Overall, California has developed what appears to
be a reasonable and nondiscriminatory method of calculating the default
emission factor, although the refinements based on space and time suggested above may make the default emission factor more accurate and more
likely to be upheld by a court.

4. The Zero-Emissions Threshold for Imported Unspecified
Electricity
California is imposing compliance obligations for unspecified electricity from all out-of-state generators, but it is not imposing compliance
obligations for electricity from in-state generators or specified out-of-state
generators that emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e annually. 472 California is
imposing compliance obligations for all unspecified electricity because there
is no way to trace the electricity to particular generators to determine
whether they emit 25,000 MTCO2e or more annually. 473 Additionally,
California will be imposing compliance obligations for all imported electricity, even from specified sources that emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e
annually, beginning in 2015. 474 California has chosen not to reduce the
threshold for energy facilities located in California on the basis that they
will be indirectly covered when fuel suppliers are regulated. 475
Imposing compliance obligations for all unspecified electricity but not
for all in-state electricity from generators that emit less than 25,000
MTCO2e appears discriminatory, as it places a higher burden on interstate
469.
CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER ADOPTION OF
AMENDMENTS TO THE REGULATION FOR MANDATORY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS, FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR RULEMAKING 112 (2010), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/ghg2010/mrrfsor.pdf [hereinafter MRR FINAL
STATEMENT OF REASONS].
470.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 602–03.
471.
Id. at 602–04, 2061–62.
472.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95812(c)(2)(B) (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF
REASONS, supra note 62, at II-12, II-19 to -20.
473.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-20.
474.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95812(d)(2) (2012).
475.
See INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-20.
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commerce than intrastate commerce. However, California has evaluated this
issue using information from the United States Energy Information Administration and from reporting from specified sources and determined
“that almost none of the electricity imported from GHG emitting sources
comes from power plants that emit less than 25,000” MTCO2e annually. 476
So while the regulation appears facially discriminatory, its effects may not
be. There is still a problem because California must show that no, rather
than almost no, importers are being subjected to greater compliance obligations than in-state generators. If there are any unspecified out-of-state
facilities that export power to California and emit less than 25,000
MTCO2e annually, then California’s regulation will be considered discriminatory.
If this provision is considered discriminatory, it will be evaluated under
strict scrutiny and California must establish that its regulation “advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 477 While this regulation advances a legitimate local purpose, California has a reasonable non-discriminatory
alternative. While, unfortunately, there is no way to differentiate unspecified electricity sold from facilities above and below the threshold,
California can expand in-state regulation. California should be able to
determine the lowest emitting out-of-state facility that likely exports power
to the state. California can then reduce the threshold for compliance obligations to that level (or, to be safe, a little lower) in order to defeat any claims
of discrimination. While California determined that it is infeasible to directly apply compliance obligations to very small in-state sources, this
should not be a problem because very small out-of-state sources do not
export their power to California. 478
While it would be administratively burdensome or even infeasible, it is
possible that a court will require California to impose compliance obligations on all in-state generators to remedy the facial appearance of
discrimination. California could potentially avoid this by changing the way
the provisions are framed. California could create an initial presumption
that all electricity is regulated, but then provide an exception for when instate or out-of-state entities demonstrate that the electricity came from a
source that emits less than 25,000 MTCO2e annually. In-state and out-ofstate facilities below the threshold could get a standing exemption to simplify things. This would create the same regulation, but without the facial
discrimination. Although no importer of unspecified electricity could rebut
the presumption, this regulation would not have discriminatory effects if no
476.
477.
478.

FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 742–43.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 742–43.
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electricity is imported from out-of-state generators that are below the
threshold. While burdensome, this would allow California to achieve its
regulatory goals.
Regarding the 2015 changes, if California is right that imposing compliance obligations on fuel distributors will indirectly impose full
compliance costs on all in-state generators that emit less than 25,000
MTCO2e annually, then there is no discrimination against interstate commerce and this part of the program will be upheld. Again, however, there is
the possibility that a court will not look past the facial difference in treatment and will require California to apply the same standard to in-state and
out-of-state electricity, in which case California will have to regulate all
generators.

5. The Compliance Obligations for Transmission Line Losses
California is imposing compliance obligations for transmission line
losses for both specified and unspecified imported electricity. 479 For specified electricity, compliance obligations are calculated based on the amount
of electricity prior to transmission (i� known), thereby including the actual
amount of electricity lost. 480 When the original amount of imported electricity from specified sources is unknown, or when the electricity is
imported from an unspecified source, compliance obligations are increased
by 2 percent to account for transmission line losses. 481
While it would be ideal to include transmission line losses and account
for all GHG emissions, doing so arguably discriminates based on place of
origin even though transmission line losses are included in the compliance
obligations of in-state generators (because their compliance obligations are
calculated before transmission). The farther away from California the generator is located, the greater the importer’s compliance obligations. Thus,
for the same amount of electricity delivered to California customers, importers from far-away generators will have greater compliance obligations
than generators located in or near California. California generators benefit
because their electricity does not have to travel very far, such that transmission line losses are small.
The key question, however, is whether there is some reason, apart from
place of origin, to treat the electricity in this manner. 482 While the increased compliance costs dovetail with distance from California, compliance
479.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95111(b)(1)–(2) (2012).
480.
Id.
481.
Id.
482.
See Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249,
261–62 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986)).
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costs are not increased based on the location of the generator. Rather, compliance costs are higher because delivering the same amount of electricity
resulted in generation of more GHG emissions. Thus, there is a clear and
justifiable reason to include transmission line losses. Additionally, this
works both ways. While distant generators will have higher compliance
costs for electricity imported into California due to line losses, California
generators will face higher compliance costs when exporting to the distant
state. As such, both in-state and out-of-state generators are being treated
the same and there is no discrimination based on place of origin.
A district court struck down California’s LCFS in part because of a
similar provision. 483 The LCFS assigns an average GHG emissions intensity to various fuels in California and requires fuel providers with aboveaverage emissions intensity to purchase credits generated by providers with
below-average emissions intensity. 484 In calculating the emissions intensity
of the fuel from each provider, the LCFS included the GHG emissions
resulting from transportation of the fuel to California, as well as other
transportation-related emissions. 485 The district court held that the inclusion of these emissions discriminated based on place of origin because they
were determined by the location of the fuel provider. 486 The Ninth Circuit
recently reversed the district court’s decision on the grounds that California
could legitimately consider the GHG emissions resulting from transportation, 487 which bodes well for California’s cap-and-trade program.

6. The Requirements for Out-of-State Facilities to Be Considered
Specified Sources o� Imported Electricity
California has established fairly stringent requirements that must be
met before importers can claim specified-source status for out-of-state
facilities and have their compliance obligations calculated by actual or generation-type emissions. 488 California requires that the importer (1) be the
facility operator of the source, have a long-term contract to purchase the
electricity from the source, or have ownership rights in the source; (2)
directly deliver the electricity; and (3) any associated RECs must be used

483.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084–94
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2013).
484.
Id. at 1080.
485.
Id. at 1086–88.
486.
Id.
487.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d. at 1088-89.
488.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(3) (2012).
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for compliance with the California RPS requirements. 489 By contrast, there
are no similar requirements for in-state facilities because they are directly
regulated. California has adopted these requirements to prevent resource
shuffling. 490
It is likely that there are out-of-state generators to which electricity can
be traced but which do not meet the requirements to be specified sources.
When the source of imported electricity can be identified, California could
treat the out-of-state source the same as in-state sources by using actual
emissions to calculate compliance obligations. While an accurate default
emission factor will result in equal burdens on in- and out-of-state generators in the aggregate, it is discriminatory to impose higher compliance
obligations (using the default emission factor) on out-of-state parties than
comparable in-state parties when the emissions intensity of the imported
electricity is ascertainable.
This means that California must establish that its regulation “advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 491 As discussed above, 492 California has a
strong local interest in preventing resource shuffling from undermining the
cap-and-trade program. However, it has non-discriminatory alternatives
that still allow it to substantially advance its interest. Although not all outof-state electricity can be traced to a specific source, California appears to
have the ability to trace electricity back to more generators than those eligible to become specified sources. This is demonstrated by the RPS
adjustment. California is providing the adjustment to importers o� RPSeligible electricity from sources that do not qualify as specified sources
because the electricity is not directly delivered. 493 In order to provide this
adjustment, California must be able to trace the electricity back to particular renewable generators. Otherwise it would not be able to determine
whether the electricity came from an RPS-eligible generator. Thus, the
electricity that can be traced back to particular generators will probably
need to have the associated compliance obligations calculated based on the
actual emissions (if reliable data for calculating them is available) or fueltype emissions of the generating facility. While this increases the risk of
resource shuffling, the prohibition against resource shuffling that CARB
plans to adopt should adequately protect the cap-and-trade program. 494
489.
Id. While the third requirement could be viewed as discriminatory because the
RECs can only be sold to California utilities, the better view is that California is simply
regulating the form of the product, electricity, by requiring that RECs not be unbundled.
490.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 16–17.
491.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
492.
See supra notes 412–425 and accompanying text.
493.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(4) (2012).
494.
See supra text accompanying notes 197–201; supra Part I.D.2.
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California should also require in-state RPS-eligible generators to retire
the RECs associated with the electricity they sell in California. This would
harmonize the in-state and out-of-state regulations and help prevent resource shuffling, as it would mean that the California RECs could not be
used to satisfy RPS obligations in other states. This would have the effect
of decreasing the amount o� low-emission electricity available to be imported into California, absent increases in supply, because the RECs associated
with that electricity would need to be used in other states (and imported
RPS-eligible electricity only qualifies as specified electricity when it is
accompanied by RECs). California should also work with and encourage
the western states to adopt demanding RPSs to increase the demand for
low-emission electricity and reduce the potential for resource shuffling.

7. The Free Allocation of Allowances to Publicly Owned Utilities
California is providing free allowances to POUs to cover the compliance obligations arising from their generation of power for their
customers. 495 This means that POUs are receiving preferential treatment, as
all private generators, both in- and out-of-state ones, must purchase allowances to cover their compliance obligations. While in-state generators are
being benefitted at the expense of out-of-state and other in-state generators, this is not a problem under the dormant Commerce Clause. Under the
public entity exception, the government is allowed to favor itself over private parties as long as no private parties are receiving preferential
treatment. 496 Under the cap-and-trade program, the only generators receiving preferential treatment are POUs, which are publicly owned and usually
do not compete with private generators. 497

8. The Prohibition Against Resource Shuffling
California has prohibited importers of out-of-state electricity from engaging in resource shuffling. 498 Resource shuffling is defined as “any plan,
scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions reductions that have
not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California grid.” 499
California has indicated that this provision is intended to avoid three primary types of resource shuffling: (1) changing unspecified sources to
specified sources only when a lower emission factor is obtained (“cherry
picking”); (2) replacing purchases from high-emitting facilities with pur495.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(a)–(b) (2012).
496.
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 342–43 (2007).
497.
See INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-31 to -32.
498.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2) (2012).
499.
Id. § 95802(a)(252).
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chases from existing low-emitting facilities to obtain a lower emission factor
(“facility swapping”); and (3) changing a high-emission source from specified to unspecified to obtain a lower emission factor (“laundering”). 500
While this provision only applies to imported electricity, that is not a
problem because in-state parties are unable to engage in resource shuffling. 501 Prohibiting the first and third types of resource shuffling is also not
discriminatory. Those prohibitions prevent regulated parties from manipulating the regulatory program to reduce their compliance obligations. They
do not prevent any legitimate form of competition by out-of-state parties.
However, prohibiting the second type of resource shuffling can be viewed
as discriminatory. Once compliance obligations are imposed, the price of
electricity from different sources changes and a new hierarchy of competitiveness is created. Prohibiting facility swapping essentially prevents outof-state parties from re-allocating their electricity to remain competitive in
the California market. This is especially true because imported electricity is
generally dirtier than electricity generated in-state, such that it will, on
average, have higher compliance obligations before it changes in response to
the program. 502 The better view is that this is not discriminatory because
in-state generators have no way to alter their sales practices to escape regulation, such that the program treats in-state and out-of-state parties the
same and places them in the same position.
If this provision is viewed as discriminatory, California must establish
that its regulation “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 503 As
discussed above, 504 California has a strong interest in preventing resource
shuffling from undermining the cap-and-trade program, and the prohibition directly advances that interest. Additionally, aside from prohibiting
resource shuffling, California has no way to adequately prevent or reduce it.
The main issue will be whether the prohibition is drafted narrowly and
clearly enough to substantially achieve California’s goals while minimizing
impacts on grid reliability and out-of-state transactions. California has
temporarily suspended this provision because of concerns about grid reliability, 505 but it will likely become an important part of the program at a
later date.

500.
COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, supra note 226, at 10.
501.
See supra text accompanying notes 197–201.
502.
ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 27.
503.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
504.
See supra notes 412–425 and accompanying text.
505.
Carroll, supra note 227.

166

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:1

9. The Cap-and-Trade Program Falls More Heavily on Out-of-State
Generators o� Electricity Than In-State Generators o� Electricity
The cap-and-trade program will likely result in greater compliance obligations for out-of-state electricity than for in-state electricity because
California has a relatively clean energy sector compared to some of the
surrounding states, most notably Utah and Nevada, which produce a large
amount of electricity from coal. 506 When considering whether a state law
has discriminatory effects, the court assesses the law’s effects on in-state
and out-of-state activities to determine if it favors in-state activities by
raising the costs for out-of-state businesses disproportionately 507 or by
eliminating competitive advantages enjoyed by out-of-state businesses as a
result of their place of origin. 508 A challenger must show that there is a shift
in market share to succeed. 509
This differential impact of the program is not discriminatory in the
constitutional sense because generators with the same emissions are being
treated the same regardless of whether they are located in-state or out-ofstate. Stated differently, generation type is not an advantage enjoyed based
on place of origin, but rather is a business decision unrelated to geographical location (aside, perhaps, from generation types that can only be located
in certain areas, such as geothermal plants). This is similar to Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, in which the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland law
that prohibited petroleum producers or refiners from operating any retail
gas stations in the state because the prohibition did not result in a shift of
market share to in-state businesses. 510 While the law only applied to out-ofstate entities, preventing a subclass of them from participating in the Maryland retail gas station business, there were still other out-of-state entities
participating in that business. 511 Similarly, while the cap-and-trade program
falls most heavily on coal generators, most of which are located out-of-state,
other out-of-state generators that use different generation types will still be
competitive with in-state generators. The facts here are even less compelling than those in Exxon because California has not prohibited any out-ofstate parties from participating in California’s electricity market. Indeed,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has expressly recognized that
506.
ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at 27.
507.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
508.
Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 261–
62 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 580 (1986)).
509.
Exxon Corp. v. Governor o� Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128–29 (1978); Black Star Farms v.
Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1231–33 (9th Cir. 2010).
510.
Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 119.
511.
Id. at 123, 125–26.
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California has the power “to favor particular generation technologies over
others.” 512
Some courts have held that there is a competitive advantage based on
place of origin when out-of-state parties are not subject to the same regulations that disadvantage in-state parties. 513 In order for this to apply,
however, there must be separate laws that provide and remove the advantage, such that invalidating the law removing the advantage would not
also invalidate the law creating the advantage. 514 The cap-and-trade program is a single regulatory scheme that is being simultaneously applied to
both in-state and out-of-state parties, such that out-of-state parties cannot
claim an advantage based on their place of origin under this theory.

10. Possible Tax-and-Subsidy Scheme
Finally, California must be careful to avoid a tax-and-subsidy scheme
like that in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy. 515 California is requiring two
categories of regulated entities to purchase allowances: (1) in-state industrial facilities that are not allocated enough allowances to meet their
compliance obligations; 516 and (2) in- and out-of-state electricity generators. 517 Revenue from the sale of allowances to the first category of entities
is being placed in the GHG Fund to provide funding for a wide array of
projects that reduce GHG emissions. 518 Revenue from the sale of allowances to the second category of entities is being given to the utilities to reduce
the impact of the cap-and-trade program on ratepayers by providing them
with rebates and by funding energy conservation measures. 519
California is basically taxing both in- and out-of-state electricity generators, with most of the generated revenue going to the utilities and the rest
going to CARB or the legislature. The utilities are to spend the money
primarily to benefit ratepayers through rebates and energy conservation
measures. To the extent that the utilities, CARB, and the legislature have
additional funds to spend, they need to be careful how they decide to spend
them.
California may need to be cautious as it decides what projects it will
fund with the revenue it is receiving. If the funds are used to finance electricity-generating projects located in California or owned by Californians,
the cap-and-trade program will be vulnerable to claims that a tax-and-subsidy
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 61,676 (1995).
Cloverland-Green, 462 F.3d at 263–67.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 270–281.
See supra text accompanying notes 92–96.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(d) (2012).
See supra text accompanying notes 92–96.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(d) (2012).

168

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:1

scheme has been created that taxes out-of-state generation of electricity and
subsidizes in-state generation of electricity. To avoid this, any grants to
generators or project developers that are financed by cap-and-trade funds
should be blind as to state of residence and site location. Alternatively, and
more simply, the funds should be used for measures other than electricity
generation projects, and any subsidies given to electricity generators should
come from the state’s general fund without reimbursement from the revenue generated by the cap-and-trade program. While the latter is a
formalistic distinction, it is one that the Court appears willing to enforce
and accept. 520
Funds can safely be spent on research and development projects for
new or improved energy technologies, as long as there is no limitation on
where the technology can later be deployed. Even if the research and development happens or demonstration projects are located in California, this is
insufficient to create a tax-and-subsidy scheme because the industry being
taxed is not the same industry being subsidized. Funds can also be spent to
reduce GHG emissions, to provide consumer relief, to fund transportation
projects, and to further a large number of other related purposes. California
is playing it safe and so far has only considered funding the safe investments. 521
Additionally, it would be ideal for all of the funds from the sale of allowances to stay out of the general fund. This would prevent any attempt to
link legislative spending on or subsidizing of renewable energy projects to
funds obtained from the sale of allowances. This is precisely what California is doing, as the legislature is requiring the auction proceeds to be placed
in the GHG Fund or to be used by utilities to provide ratepayer relief. 522
If California subsidizes in-state electricity generation and a court determines that California’s program constitutes a tax-and-subsidy scheme,
California will be unable to prevail under strict scrutiny because it could
simply stop subsidizing in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state
interests.

B. Does California’s Program Regulate Extraterritorially?
In addition to being vulnerable to claims of discrimination, the capand-trade program is vulnerable to the claim that it attempts to regulate
520.
See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (“Direct subsidization
of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.”); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
809 (1977) (noting that states can subsidize their local industries); Newberry, supra note 305,
at 555.
521.
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-29 to -30.
522.
Id.
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extraterritorially. The three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court
provides a helpful framework for analysis.

1. Direct Regulation of Out-of-State Activities
“First, the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.’” 523 It is clear
that this is not a situation in which a state regulation directly applies to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of California’s borders. By its
terms, the cap-and-trade program only applies to out-of-state parties when
they voluntarily import electricity into California, and even then only regulates the electricity that is being imported.

2. Practical Effect of Controlling Out-of-State Activities
Second, a state law that has the practical effect of controlling commerce
that occurs completely outside a state’s boundaries is invalid, regardless of
whether the legislature intended the law to have an extraterritorial reach. 524
This part of the extraterritoriality test will be the most difficult for California to overcome. California is indirectly regulating out-of-state commerce
in two ways. First, California is indirectly regulating GHG emissions in
other states by imposing compliance obligations for those emissions. Second, California is indirectly regulating energy transactions in other states
through its prohibition on resource shuffling. While California has temporarily suspended this provision because of concerns about grid reliability, 525
it will likely become an important part of the program at a later date.
First, California is regulating imported electricity to account for and
reduce the GHG emissions associated with its use of electricity. The major
problem is that these GHG emissions occur outside of the state and compliance obligations are calculated based on out-of-state activities, as the
number of allowances that must be submitted is determined by the GHG
emissions of the out-of-state generators (as well as the amount of electricity
that the importer decides to import). Importers will have to account for
these GHG compliance obligations when they purchase electricity from
generators in other states, affecting both which generators are purchased
from and what they are paid for their electricity. Some generators may have
to install technology or otherwise take steps to reduce their GHG emissions to maintain their competitiveness.
523.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
524.
Id.
525.
Carroll, supra note 227.
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The critical question is whether these facts are sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that the practical effect of the cap-and-trade program is to control out-of-state commerce. While the issue is close, the better view is that
they do not. Although California is attempting to account for and reduce
GHG emissions that occur outside of the state, it is not attempting to
control the sources of those emissions. California has placed no limit on the
GHG emissions of out-of-state generators, created no requirement that
they install any GHG-reducing technology, and imposed no regulation on
the energy transactions that take place outside of its borders. Rather, California is regulating entities that import electricity into California from
those sources, such that California is primarily regulating the effects of its
use of electricity. To the extent that out-of-state businesses have to account
for California’s regulations, this is a common feature of modern life. All
states have complicated regulatory schemes. It is no more burdensome to
account for GHG costs than to account for any other local regulations.
While there are some parallels between the cap-and-trade regulation
and the milk regulations in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., the cap-and-trade
program is distinguishable. In Baldwin, New York required importers to pay
the same minimum price to producers in other states that milk dealers were
required to pay New York producers before they could sell their milk in
New York. 526 While not directly applying to the purchase of milk in other
states, it had the effect of requiring importers to pay producers in other
states the minimum price. 527 Unlike the New York milk law, the cap-andtrade regulations do not require importers to pay or refrain from paying
anything to out-of-state generators. While it is likely that importers will
demand discounts from high-emission generators, it is also likely that they
will pay premiums to low-emission generators. California’s regulations only
have incidental effects on the amounts that generators are paid and primarily have the effect of shifting income among the different classes of
generators for electricity that is being imported into California, which is
insufficient for a successful challenge. 528
Critically, the New York law in Baldwin was intended to prevent and
had the effect of preventing milk producers in other states from underselling milk producers in New York. It was not part of a single regulatory
regime meant to achieve a legitimate purpose inside the state. Under the
526.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519–22 (1935).
527.
Id.
528.
Nat’l Kerosene Heater Ass’n v. Massachusetts, 653 F. Supp. 1079, 1095 (D. Mass.
1986) (“Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause cases make clear that ‘burden’, in its
constitutional sense, refers not to any forced changes in market structure or prices or available products. Burden refers to a hindering of the interstate commercial system. Such
hindering will generally only be shown by discrimination—by ‘economic protectionism’—or
by interference with uniformity, where uniformity has been shown to be necessary.”).
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cap-and-trade program, out-of-state generators can still undersell comparable California generators by the same amount that they could before the
program existed. The compliance costs increase uniformly for all electricity
with comparable GHG emissions, such that any price differential between
similarly situated in-state and out-of-state generators that previously existed is untouched. While high-emitting generators are now less competitive
than low-emitting generators, in-state and out-of-state generators are affected in precisely the same way.
Second, California is indirectly regulating energy transactions in other
states by prohibiting resource shuffling. 529 California has indicated that this
provision is intended to prevent three primary types of resource shuffling:
(1) cherry picking, (2) facility swapping, and (3) laundering. 530
As noted above, the first and third types of resource shuffling are clearly within California’s power to regulate, as they represent attempts by
covered entities to manipulate the cap-and-trade regulations to reduce their
compliance obligations. The second type of resource shuffling is more
problematic because it involves the purchase or sale of electricity outside
the state. California is regulating these transactions to some degree, as it is
effectively prohibiting the importation of electricity from certain generators
in certain circumstances. This means that some out-of-state energy transactions will be different than they would be absent the resource shuffling
provision.
While the resource shuffling provision will have some effects on out-ofstate energy transactions, California has tailored it to only apply to entities
that are engaging in activities within the state. The attestation requires that
the importer certify that the electricity being imported is not being imported as part of a “plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions
reductions that have not occurred.” 531 As such, California is not truly controlling anything that occurs outside of its borders. Businesses can engage
in any out-of-state energy transactions that they want; they are only limited
in what electricity they can import into California and even then only in
certain circumstances.
The extraterritorial effects of regulating GHG emissions and prohibiting resource shuffling should be considered incidental. The
extraterritoriality principle has been applied sparingly by courts and only in
situations in which states were controlling conduct that occurred completely
outside of the state. California is not controlling transactions occurring
wholly outside of the state, and the regulations do not reduce the competitiveness of out-of-state generators as compared to their identical in-state
529.
530.
531.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(1) (2012).
See supra text accompanying notes 197–201.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(245) (2012).
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peers. While California creates incentives to reduce GHG emissions and to
not engage in resource shuffling, incentives do not constitute extraterritorial regulation.
A district court initially struck down California’s LCFS after adopting
a very broad reading of the extraterritoriality principle and holding that the
incentives to reduce GHG emissions created by California’s LCFS amounted to extraterritorial control of GHG emissions in other states. 532 This
broad reading would have disastrous consequences for state regulation on a
host of different subjects, as most state regulations create some incentives
for out-of-state parties to take some action. Additionally, given the entirely
subjective nature of the district court’s new test (how much incentive is too
much?), this broad reading would open the door for unwarranted judicial
policymaking at the expense of elected officials.
The Ninth Circuit recently reversed the district court with reasoning in
line with the analysis presented in this Article. 533 This case provides helpful
precedent upholding California’s ability to create incentives for out-of-state
parties doing business in California to reduce their GHG emissions. However, the cap-and-trade program has more onerous out-of-state impacts,
particularly in connection with the resource-shuffling provisions, leaving
some remaining uncertainty concerning whether courts will uphold California’s cap-and-trade program against claims that it regulates
extraterritorially.

3. Interference with Regulations of Other States
Third, the court must consider whether the state law interferes with the
legitimate regulations of other states and what the effect would be if other
states adopted similar laws. 534 A party usually “must either present evidence
that conflicting, legitimate legislation is already in place or that the threat
of such legislation is both actual and imminent.” 535 This part of the test also
does not pose much threat to California’s program.
There are three potential ways in which the cap-and-trade program’s
regulation of imported electricity could interfere with the regulations of
other states. First, it can be argued that the decision whether or not to
regulate GHG emissions should be made by the state in which generators
reside. If those states choose not regulate GHG emissions, then California
is interfering with their decision to some degree by imposing compliance
532.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1091–92
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2013).
533.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1101–06.
534.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989).
535.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 469–70 (9th Cir. 2001).
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obligations on electricity from those states. The better view is that California has left the decision to regulate those generators to the states in which
they reside: it is only regulating electricity that enters California. Regardless of which view one takes, this general appeal to individual state policy
determinations does not demonstrate the necessary interference or conflict
with regulations adopted by other states for a successful challenge.
Second, it is possible that the cap-and-trade program may conflict with
the regulation of generators in other states. For example, other states may
require facilities to have certain technology that is incompatible with the
technology that most efficiently reduces GHG emissions. Even if such
conflicts exist, as indeed they must for a challenge to be successful, California is not requiring any specific technology to be used by facilities in other
states, even if that technology would benefit those facilities by reducing
GHG emissions and corresponding compliance obligations. Because there
are no specific requirements placed on out-of-state generators, there will
never be an actual conflict between the cap-and-trade program and specific
equipment or facility requirements placed on generators in other states.
Finally, it is possible that interstate commerce would be double charged
or face inconsistent obligations if the same regulatory regime were adopted
in other states. Because California’s regulation includes a provision that
exempts imported electricity from states with qualifying cap-and-trade
programs from compliance obligations, 536 this is not presently an issue,
although it could become one in the future. If other states adopt cap-andtrade programs, a refusal by California to waive compliance obligations for
electricity from those states might violate the dormant Commerce Clause
because generators would be subject to duplicate, inconsistent regulations.
Additionally, it will probably be technically difficult, and in some cases
impossible, to determine which state exported electricity in order to avoid
double taxing unspecified electricity sold by marketers. Whether this becomes a problem is yet to be seen.

C. If California’s Program Only Imposes Nondiscriminatory and Incidental
Extraterritorial Burdens on Interstate Commerce, Will It Survive the Pike
Balancing Test?
If a court decides that California’s regulations do not discriminate
against interstate commerce or regulate extraterritorially, the regulations
will be assessed and likely upheld under the lenient Pike balancing test.
“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
536.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b) (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT
supra note 62, at II-6, II-43 to -44.
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will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” 537 “State laws frequently
survive this Pike scrutiny.” 538 The three prongs of this test are addressed in
turn.
First, California must have a legitimate local public interest that is being served by the regulation. 539 California clearly has a strong interest in
mitigating climate change by reducing GHG emissions given the impacts
that climate change will have on the state. The impacts that climate change
will have on California 540 and the strength of California’s interest in mitigating climate change 541 were discussed supra.
Second, there are burdens imposed on interstate commerce by California’s regulation of imported electricity. 542 California is burdening interstate
commerce by imposing compliance obligations on importers. For most
importers, this burden is identical to that faced by in-state generators,
making the burden minimal because it is simply an added cost of doing
business in California. The regulations should not discourage most importers from selling electricity into California because electricity prices in
California will increase to account for compliance costs. A profitable marketplace will make it worthwhile for importers to continue serving
California’s electricity needs. There may be a greater burden if the default
emission factor chosen is less accurate than it could be, as this would impose
more onerous compliance obligations on some importers than is necessary
and may alter market behavior in a way that affects electricity flows. 543
Greater burdens on interstate commerce are imposed by California’s resource shuffling prohibition. By prohibiting importation of electricity that
was purchased as part of a scheme or plan to reduce compliance obligations
without reducing emissions, California will cause changes in the interstate
electricity market and will force some importers to not undertake actions
that they would have otherwise undertaken. The worst problems arise from
the lack of clarity regarding what is actually prohibited, which is what led to
its temporary suspension. While there is an intent requirement, it is not
clear what constitutes a scheme or plan to illicitly reduce compliance obligations and what constitutes legitimate business activity. Quite a few
stakeholders raised this concern during the vetting of the regulations. 544 If
importers are unsure what transactions are prohibited, this could create
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008).
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
See supra notes 412–425 and accompanying text.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 1595–96.
Id. at 2087–98; Carroll, supra note 227.
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instability in the interstate electricity market. One of the five commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission called on California to
either clarify the prohibition or discard it, warning that an unclear prohibition of resource shuffling could cause serious grid reliability problems. 545 In
response, California has temporarily suspended this provision, 546 but it will
likely become an important part of the program at a later date.
Another potential issue is grid reliability. The New York Independent
System Operator conducted a study of the RGGI in 2008 and determined
that there could be a risk of grid unreliability if there were insufficient
allowances to allow all needed power to be supplied. 547 This issue was not
raised in later reports, so this risk does not appear to have materialized as a
result of the RGGI cap-and-trade program. California has worked closely
with CAISO in designing its cap-and-trade regulations, so presumably the
cap-and-trade program has been designed with either no or only slight risks
to grid reliability. 548
The next task is to weigh California’s local benefits against the burden
on interstate commerce to determine if “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” 549 On
balance, California’s interests outweigh the burden on interstate commerce,
at least if California clarifies the resource shuffling prohibition before implementing it. The burdens on interstate commerce are not insignificant,
but they are primarily the type o� burden that accompanies a great many
state regulations—increased costs and administrative work. We are not
dealing with a suspicious state regulation “requiring business operations to
be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed
elsewhere.” 550 California should, however, work to clarify the resource shuffling prohibition and to fine-tune the default emission factor in order to
further reduce burdens on interstate commerce.
While California’s interests outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce, this is not required for its regulations to survive Pike scrutiny. The
test requires that “the burden imposed on such commerce [be] clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” 551 for a law to be invalid. A
court need not decide with certainty whether the state’s law will achieve its
545.
Carroll, supra note 227.
546.
Id.
547.
N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 2008 RELIABILITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT, SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS, AND LIST OF APPENDICES FOR THE 2008 COMPREHENSIVE RELIABILITY
PLANNING PROCESS I-25 to -27 (2007), available at http://www.nyiso.com/public
/webdocs/services/planning/reliability_assessments/2008_RNA__Supporting_FINAL_REPOR
T_12_12.pdf.
548.
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 604.
549.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
550.
Id. at 145.
551.
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
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goals, for it assesses the law’s putative benefits. As long as it is debatable
that the law will advance the legitimate local interests, questions of efficacy
and efficiency are for the legislature. 552 This is well-illustrated by Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law that was as likely to achieve its goal as to undermine it. 553
Uncertainty in scientific predictions of climate change seems to be an improvement over the state of affairs in Clover Leaf, as in that case there was
directly contradictory evidence of approximately equal weight to the evidence on which the legislature relied.
Finally, California must not have any less burdensome alternative
methods to accomplish its purpose. 554 California is regulating imported
electricity the way it is because of the unique difficulties associated with
regulating imported electricity, and there do not appear to be alternatives to
the general method of regulation chosen. California can clarify the resource
shuffling prohibition, which is the one of the main burdens on interstate
commerce. Otherwise, the only option that California has to avoid imposing a burden on interstate commerce is to not regulate imported electricity.
However, this is not really an option. Not regulating imported electricity
would significantly undermine the cap-and-trade program. Additionally,
the fact that California may be able to find other ways to reduce GHG
emissions is insufficient to warrant invalidation of the regulation of imported electricity. California is reducing GHG emissions through all possible
avenues, which prevents there from being any alternative methods to
achieve the same reductions.
In sum, the parts of California’s program that are assessed under the
Pike balancing test should be upheld because the burdens on interstate
commerce are not clearly excessive to the putative local benefits to the state.
This may, however, require reevaluation if the use of a default emission
factor or the resource shuffling prohibition have greater effects on interstate
commerce than is predicted here.

CONCLUSION
California has once again taken the lead in pioneering environmental
regulations to address one of the most important environmental threats of
our time. This bold new regulatory program is at serious risk of invalidation
under the dormant Commerce Clause, and only time will tell if California’s
cap-and-trade program will survive the challenge that is sure to come.
While California’s regulations are ideal from a regulatory standpoint, it is
552.
553.
554.

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469–71 (1981).
Id. at 458–60.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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unlikely that a court will uphold all of them in their current form. In the
process of reaching this conclusion, I have proposed a number of refinements that are more likely to withstand a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge while still achieving significant reductions of GHG emissions and
preventing leakage and resource shuffling.
The success of California’s program is vital to national and international efforts to reduce GHG emissions. If the program is successful, it is likely
that other states will join California by implementing cap-and-trade programs of their own. Given that the United States is the second largest
emitter of greenhouse gases in the world and one of the primary barriers to
international action, a successful California program could be the catalyst
for serious international efforts to reduce greenhouse gases to avert the
worst impacts of climate change. If the program is derailed by lawsuits or
excessive costs, it could spell the end for cap-and-trade in the United
States.
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